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I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. 2014 Cases
1. Haeker v. United States
No. CV 14–20, 2014 WL 4388278 (D. Mont. Sept. 4, 2014).
Plaintiff Kurt Haeker brought this action seeking to partition his
undivided fee interest in land within the Crow Indian Reservation.
The United States, which holds legal title to the remaining
undivided legal interest in trust for the benefit of several Indian
allottees, moved to dismiss Haeker’s Second Amended Complaint.
The Magistrate Judge entered Findings and Recommendations
in which she recommended that the Second Amended Complaint
be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Haeker’s motion presented a
novel issue with a scant amount of relevant case law. Despite this,
the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion was well-reasoned and
supported by the legal authorities cited therein.
After reviewing the Findings and Recommendations, the court
did not find that Judge Ostby committed clear error.
Haeker’s Second Amended Complaint was dismissed with
prejudice.
2. Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. Jewell
767 F.3d 900 (9th Cir. 2014). Indian tribe and its members
brought action alleging that Interior Secretary, acting through
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), violated Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) by determining that the Department of Interior was not
authorized to approve tribe’s assignments of land to certain of its
members.
The district court entered summary judgment in the Secretary’s
favor, and plaintiffs appealed.
The appellate court held that: (1) tribe was prohibited by Indian
Nonintercourse Act from approving land assignment deeds to tribal
members in manner similar to fee simple ownership, and
(2) Interior Secretary was not authorized to approve conveyances.
Affirmed.
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3. Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde Cmty. of Or. v. Jewell
75 F. Supp. 3d 387 (D.D.C. 2014). This consolidated action
arose under the Administrative Procedure Act, the Indian
Reorganization Act, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. and the
National Environmental Policy Act. Plaintiffs challenged the
Secretary of the Department of Interior's decision to acquire and
hold in trust approximately 152 acres in Clark County, Washington
for the Cowlitz Indian Tribe, the Intervenor–Defendant. Plaintiffs
further challenged the Secretary's decision to allow gaming on that
land, and disputed whether the Secretary had complied with
NEPA's requirements. Before the court were the parties' crossmotions for summary judgment.
In 2002, the Department of Interior federally acknowledged the
Cowlitz after finding that the tribe had existed as an Indian entity
on a substantially continuous basis since at least 1878–80 and that
it had satisfied the criteria set forth in 25 C.F.R. part 83. 67 Fed.
Reg. 607 (Jan. 4, 2002); 65 Fed. Reg. 8,436 (Feb. 18, 2000).
Immediately upon receiving federal acknowledgment, the Cowlitz
submitted an application requesting that the Secretary take into
trust 151.87 acres of land in Clark County, Washington (Parcel)
and declare it the Tribe's “initial reservation” under the IRA. The
Tribe claimed its purpose was to “create a federally-protected land
base on which the Cowlitz Indian Tribe can establish and operate a
tribal government headquarters to provide housing, health care,
education and other governmental services to its members, and
conduct the economic development necessary to fund these tribal
government programs, provide employment opportunities for its
members, and allow the Tribe to become economically selfsufficient.”
In August 2005, the Cowlitz submitted its proposed tribal
gaming ordinance for review, which the NIGC eventually
approved. As part of the tribal gaming ordinance review process,
the NIGC issued an opinion in November 2005 which found that
the Parcel qualified for IGRA's “restored lands” exception to the
general prohibition on gaming. The NIGC explicitly noted in its
November 2005 opinion that if the Secretary accepted the Parcel
into trust, the Department of Interior could proclaim the Parcel to
be the tribe's initial reservation. According to the NIGC, “[a]n
‘initial reservation proclamation would provide a second basis by
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which the [P]arcel would qualify as Indian lands on which the
Tribe could conduct gaming.” The Tribe's application to take the
Parcel into federal trust prompted the NEPA process. The Bureau
of Indian Affairs issued a draft Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) concerning the proposed actions surrounding the Parcel.
After a period of public comment, the final EIS was issued on May
30, 2008.
In April 2013, the Secretary of the Department of the Interior
through her designee, the Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs
issued a Record of Decision (ROD) accepting the Parcel into trust
and declaring that gaming would be allowed on the land.
Plaintiffs were entities and individuals who opposed the
construction of the Cowlitz casino-resort complex. Plaintiffs
challenged: (1) the decision to accept into federal trust the Parcel
pursuant to Section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934
(IRA); (2) the decision to allow the Cowlitz to conduct gaming
activities on the Parcel once the Secretary has accepted the land
into trust; and (3) the Secretary's compliance with the NEPA.
The court denied Plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment and
granted Defendants' cross-motions for summary judgment.
4. Walker River Paiute Tribe v. U.S. Dep’t. of Hous. and Urban
Dev.
68 F. Supp. 3d 1202 (D. Nev. 2014). Before the court was
plaintiff Walker River Paiute Tribe's (WRPT) motion for summary
judgment. Defendants filed an opposition and cross-motion for
summary judgment.
Plaintiff WRPT was a federally recognized Indian tribe located
in Nevada. WRPT filed the underlying declaratory and injunctive
relief action alleging that defendants improperly offset the amount
of federal funding WRPT received in fiscal year 2009 in violation
of the Native American Housing Assistance and Self–
Determination Act (NAHASDA).
In early 2008, HUD conducted an audit of plaintiff WRPT's
IHBG funding. In the audit, HUD determined that WRPT had been
overfunded in fiscal year 2008 in the amount of $110,444 due to an
inflated FCAS calculation. HUD then reduced WRPT's grant for
fiscal year 2009 by $110,444 in order to recapture the overpaid
funds.
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WRPT initiated the action against HUD under the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706, seeking a
determination that HUD's promulgation and interpretation of 24
C.F.R. § 1000.318 was arbitrary and capricious. WRPT filed an
amended complaint seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. In its
amended complaint, WRPT contended that the exclusion of
dwelling units from the block grant formula is in violation of the
specific pre-amendment statutory language of NAHASDA,
particularly 25 U.S.C. § 4152 (1996). Further, WRPT alleged that
HUD's recapture of funds was in violation of WRPT's due process
rights because HUD did not comply with the notice and hearing
requirements of 25 U.S.C. §§ 4161 and 4165 (2008).
The court granted in part and denied in part plaintiff’s motion
for summary judgment. The court also granted in part and denied
in part defendant’s counter motion for summary judgment.
B. January–March Cases
1. Hous. Auth. of Te-Moak Tribe of Western Shoshone Indians v.
U.S. Dep’t. of Hous. and Urban Dev.
85 F. Supp. 3d 1213 (D. Nev. 2015). Housing authority for
Indian tribe commenced action alleging that Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) promulgated funding
regulations that violated Native American Housing Assistance and
Self–Determination Act (NAHASDA). Parties moved for summary
judgment.
The district court held that: (1) funding regulations under
NAHASDA did not have to be interpreted in manner that favored
plaintiff; (2) NAHASDA’s block-grant formula was required to be
related to the need of all tribal housing entities; (3) HUD
regulation, which disqualified funding for housing units which
were no longer owned or operated by a tribal housing entity, was
consistent with the mandate of NAHASDA, and was not arbitrary
nor capricious; (4) post-audit interpretation of regulation was
arbitrary and capricious as applied to tribe; and (5) HUD had
authority pursuant to payment by mistake doctrine to recoup funds
paid to Indian tribe to operate its housing program without
complying with statute’s notice and opportunity for hearing
requirements.
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Motions granted in part and denied in part.
2. Mishewal Wappo Tribe of Alexander Valley v. Jewell
84 F. Supp. 3d 930 (N.D. Cal. 2015). In the earlier part of the
twentieth century, the United States government passed a series of
laws affecting its relationship with the indigenous inhabitants of
California and their descendants. One of those laws, the Indian
Appropriations Act of 1906, permitted the Secretary of the Interior
(Secretary) to purchase parcels of land, or “rancherias,” throughout
the state for use by California Indians. Fifty years later, Congress
enacted another law, the California Rancheria Act of 1958 (CRA),
which authorized the Secretary to dissolve the same rancherias it
had previously authorized.
At issue in this action was the termination and distribution of
one of those rancherias, the Alexander Valley Rancheria
(Rancheria), which, when it existed, was located in Sonoma
County. Plaintiff, the Mishewal Wappo Tribe of Alexander Valley,
alleged in this action that the process utilized by the Secretary to
terminate the Rancheria between 1959 and 1961 was inconsistent
with the CRA and therefore unlawful. The Federal Defendants
disagreed. Federal jurisdiction arose pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
The court found that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by the
applicable statute of limitations.
The Federal Defendants’ motion was therefore granted and
Plaintiff’s motion denied.
3. Crow Tribal Hous. Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t. of Hous. and Urban
Dev.
781 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2015). Tribal housing authority
brought action to challenge action by Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) to recoup alleged overpayments of
grant funds to housing authority under Native American Housing
Assistance and Self-Determination Act (NAHASDA). The District
court, 924 F. Supp. 2d 1217, ruled that HUD violated Tribe’s right
to NAHASDA’s notice and hearing and remanded case to HUD for
hearing. HUD appealed.
The appellate court held that: (1) on-site review triggered
opportunity for hearing; and (2) HUD was not required to hold
hearing.
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Vacated, reversed, and remanded.
4. Verona v. Jewell
No. 6:08–cv–0647, 2015 WL 1400291 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 26,
2015). Plaintiffs, the Town of Verona, the Town of Vernon,
Abraham Acee, and Arthur Strife (collectively, “Plaintiffs”),
commenced this action to challenge a Record of Decision issued
by the Department of the Interior (DOI) acquiring over 13,000
acres of land in Central New York into trust for the benefit of the
Oneida Indian Nation of New York (OIN). Plaintiffs commenced
this action under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
5 U.S.C. § 551, and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2201 and 2202.3.
Plaintiffs’ Complaint raised the following claims: (1) § 5 of the
IRA, as applied to the State of New York, violates the Tenth
Amendment; (2) the IRA does not apply to the lands for which
OIN requested trust status because the lands were never the subject
of allotment under the GAA, OIN was neither federally recognized
nor under federal jurisdiction in 1934, and OIN voted not to have
the IRA apply to it; and (3) DOI’s determination was arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, and otherwise not in accordance
with the law because it was based on the erroneous assumption that
Turning Stone was legally operated under the IGRA and failed to
consider various factors under the applicable regulations.
OIN submitted a request to DOI under § 5 of the IRA
requesting that the Secretary acquire approximately 17,370 acres in
Madison County and Oneida County, New York in trust status for
OIN. The request comprised properties that were reacquired by
OIN in open-market transactions, two centuries after they had last
been possessed by the Oneidas. The land was the location of OIN’s
Turning Stone Resort & Casino, a Class III casino under the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701; various other
commercial enterprises, such as gas stations and golf courses; and
OIN’s government and cultural facilities. OIN intended to continue
existing uses of the land.
In the final EIS, DOI analyzed the environmental and
socioeconomic impacts of the proposed action—acquiring the full
17,370 acres requested in trust—and eight reasonable alternatives.
DOI issued its decision to accept approximately 13,003.89 acres in
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trust for the Nation. Under the selected alternative, 4,284 of the
requested acres would not be placed into trust. The selected lands
were centered around Turning Stone in Oneida County and OIN’s
32-acre territory in Madison County. The decision included lands
in the Towns of Verona and Vernon, both located in Oneida
County.
The court found that Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden under
the APA. The Record demonstrates that Defendants reached a
reasonable decision that took account of the applicable regulatory
factors. Moreover, Defendants considered and responded to the
objections raised by Plaintiffs. Accordingly, the Court found
Defendants’ decision to acquire the land in trust was not arbitrary
and capricious, and that summary judgment is warranted in favor
of Defendants on Plaintiffs’ arbitrary and capricious claims.
The court granted Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
on all remaining claims.
5. Upstate Citizens for Equality, Inc. v. Jewell
No. 5:08–cv–0633, 2015 WL 1399366 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 26,
2015). Plaintiffs Upstate Citizens for Equality, Inc. (UCE), a nonprofit corporation; and a number of UCE’s officers, Richard
Tallcot, Daniel T. Warren, Scott Peterman, and David Vickers
(collectively, “Plaintiffs”), commenced this action to challenge a
Record of Decision issued by Department of the Interior (DOI)
taking over 13,000 acres of land in Central New York into trust for
the benefit of the Oneida Indian Nation of New York (OIN).2
Plaintiffs subsequently submitted an Amended Complaint,
which challenged a separate decision by the General Services
Administration to transfer 18 acres. Defendants filed a Motion for
partial dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims and a Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs’ supplementary claim.
The court granted Defendants’ Motions in their entirety.
Defendants moved for summary judgment on the remaining claims
in Plaintiffs’ Complaint and Plaintiffs filed a letter motion for
summary judgment.
A newly central issue raised in Plaintiffs’ challenge to the ROD
was whether OIN was eligible to have land taken into trust under
2

See supra Part I.B(4) (detailing factual background).
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the IRA in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Carcieri
v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009). In Carcieri, the Supreme Court
determined that the word “now” in the definition of “Indian” in the
IRA – ”all persons of Indian descent who are members of any
recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction” – meant
the date of the IRA’s enactment in 1934. Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 381.
Thus, to be eligible to have land taken into trust under the IRA, a
tribe must have been under federal jurisdiction in 1934.
Since Carcieri had not been addressed in the ROD, the court
issued a Memorandum–Decision and Order denying all motions
for summary judgment across the related cases, and remanding to
DOI to establish a record and determine in the first instance
whether OIN was under federal jurisdiction in 1934.
DOI filed an Amendment to the ROD applying Carcieri to
OIN, consistent with the Court’s remand. The opinion concluded
that OIN “was under federal jurisdiction in 1934 because the
Oneidas voted in an election called and conducted by the Secretary
of the Department of the Interior pursuant to Section 18 of the IRA
on June 18, 1936.” The Opinion determined that while the vote
alone was sufficient, there were a number of other federal actions
which, “either in themselves or taken together,” establish that OIN
was under federal jurisdiction in 1934.
The court granted Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
on all remaining claims.
C. April–June Cases
1. Patchak v. Jewell
109 F. Supp. 3d 152 (D.D.C. 2015). This case was before the
court on remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia and the Supreme Court of the United States.
Plaintiff, David Patchak, challenged the Secretary of the Interior’s
(Secretary) decision to take into trust two parcels of land in
Allegan County, Michigan, on behalf of the Intervenor–Defendant
Match–E–Be–Nash–She–Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians (the
“Tribe”) pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), 25
U.S.C. § 465.
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Since this case was remanded, two events have altered the legal
landscape. First, on September 3, 2014, the Secretary issued an
Amended Notice of Decision concerning the Tribe’s fee-to-trust
application for two other parcels of land it sought to acquire. In so
doing, the Secretary expressly considered, and confirmed, its
authority under the IRA to take land into trust on behalf of the
Tribe. Second, on September 26, 2014, President Obama signed
into law the Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act (Act). The
Act declares as follows: “The land taken into trust by the United
States for the benefit of the Match–E–Be–Nash–She–Wish Band of
Pottawatomi Indians . . . is reaffirmed as trust land, and the actions
of the Secretary of the Interior in taking that land into trust are
ratified and confirmed. . . . Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, an action (including an action pending in a Federal court as of
the date of enactment of this Act) relating to the land . . . shall not
be filed or maintained in a Federal court and shall be promptly
dismissed.”
This action was therefore dismissed.
II. CHILD WELFARE LAW AND ICWA
A. 2014 Cases
1. In re Alexandria P.
176 Cal. Rptr. 3d 468 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014). County
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed
dependency petition. The superior court, No. CK58667, sustained
jurisdictional allegations, terminated father’s reunification
services, and scheduled a hearing for termination of parental rights,
granted de facto parent status to foster parents, found that foster
parents had not demonstrated good cause to depart from Indian
Child Welfare Act (ICWA) placement preferences, and ordered a
gradual transition for the child to move from the foster parents’
home to pre-adoptive placement in child’s paternal stepgrandfather’s niece’s home. Foster parents appealed.
The appellate court held that: (1) foster parents lacked standing
to challenge constitutionality of ICWA placement preferences;
(2) child’s tribe’s consent to foster care placement with a family
outside of foster care placement preferences identified in ICWA
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did not waive ICWA adoption placement preferences; (3) clear and
convincing standard of proof applied to determinations of good
cause to depart from ICWA placement preferences; (4) departure
from ICWA placement preferences required significant risk of
serious harm to child, not certainty of serious harm; (5) trial court
was required to consider the bond between child and her foster
family in determining whether to depart from ICWA placement
preferences; and (6) trial court was required to consider best
interest of child in determining whether to depart from ICWA
placement preferences.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
2. In re Candace A.
332 P.3d 578 (Alaska 2014). The Office of Children’s Services
(OCS) filed a petition to adjudicate Indian child as a child in need
of aid. The superior court adjudicated child as a child in need of
aid and ordered her to be returned to her parents’ home. The OCS
appealed.
The Supreme Court of Alaska held that the Indian Child
Welfare Act’s (ICWA) requirement that any decision to place an
Indian child with someone other than the child’s parent or Indian
custodian must be “supported by clear and convincing evidence,
including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the
continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is
likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the
child” did not require the expert to have expertise in Alaskan
Native culture, and thus social workers could qualify as experts.
Reversed and remanded.
3. In re J.S.
E060554, 2014 WL 4467529 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2014).
County department of public social services filed dependency
petition. The superior court, No. INJ1200541, terminated both
parents’ parental rights. Both parents appealed.
The appellate court held that: (1) tribe’s letter established that
child, who was merely eligible for enrollment, was not a member;
(2) court rule requiring dependency court to direct the department
to make active efforts to obtain tribal enrollment for an eligible
child was invalid; and (3) substantial evidence reflected that
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department fulfilled any obligation it might have had to assist with
tribal membership application.
Affirmed.
4. In re M.S.
2014 MT 265, 376 Mont. 394, 336 P.3d 930. Department of
Public Health and Human Services filed petition to terminate
parental rights of mother and Indian father to Indian child. Notice
was given to father’s tribe, and tribe intervened. The petition was
dismissed and then refiled. Mother voluntarily relinquished her
parental rights. The Eighth Judicial District court entered order
terminating father’s parental rights, and he appealed.
The Supreme Court of Montana held that: (1) evidence did not
show that Department strictly complied with requirements for
notice to tribe under Indian Child Welfare Act; (2) Department’s
failure to strictly comply with notice requirements was harmless
error; (3) Department made active efforts to provide remedial
services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent breakup
of Indian family, as prerequisite to termination of father’s parental
rights; (4) district court adequately found that continued custody of
child by father was likely to result in serious emotional or physical
damage to child; and (5) termination of parental rights was not by
summary judgment.
Affirmed.
5. Dep’t of Human Serv. v. J.M.
338 P.3d 191 (Or. Ct. App. 2014). In child dependency
proceedings, parents appealed judgment of the circuit court
changing the permanency plan for their child from reunification to
adoption.
The appellate court held that: (1) permanency hearing was not
a key juncture in which due process prohibited admission of
exhibits under relaxed standards for competency of evidence;
(2) agency provided active efforts to parents under Indian Child
Welfare Act (ICWA); (3) father and mother failed to make
sufficient progress to allow child to return home safely; and
(4) change in plan from reunification to adoption was not a “foster
care placement” under ICWA.
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Affirmed.
6. In re L.S.
179 Cal. Rptr. 3d 316 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014). County Health and
Human Services Agency filed dependency petition alleging
children were at risk. Following contested dispositional hearing,
parents filed motion to modify bypass order and sought
reunification services. The superior court denied the motion,
terminated parental rights, and selected adoption as the children’s
permanent plan. Parents appealed.
The appellate court held that: (1) preponderance of the
evidence burden of proof applied to parents’ petitions for
modification; (2) error in applying heightened clear and convincing
evidence standard of proof was not harmless; (3) court was
required to consider whether Indian Child Welfare Act applied;
and (4) beneficial parental relationship exception did not apply.
Reversed and remanded.
7. In re Interest of Shayla H.
855 N.W.2d 774 (Neb. 2014). The Department of Health and
Human Services (DHHS) initiated dependency proceedings
concerning father's three Native American children. The Juvenile
Court adjudicated children as dependent, and subsequently entered
dispositional order that the DHHS had made reasonable efforts at
reunification, but that it was in best interests of children that father
have only physical custody of children and that DHHS retain legal
custody. Father appealed.
The appellate court, 22 Neb. App. 1, 846 N.W. 2d 668,
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. DHHS petitioned
for review.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska held that in dependency
proceedings involving Native American children, DHHS had to
make active efforts at reunification, not merely reasonable efforts,
pursuant to Indian Child Welfare Act and Nebraska Indian Child
Welfare Act.
Affirmed.
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8. Asa'carsarmuit Tribal Council v. Wheeler III
337 P.3d 1182 (Alaska 2014) Father filed emergency motion to
modify custody after State initiated Child In Need of Aid (CINA)
action against mother. Tribal council which had issued original
custody order was permitted to intervene. The superior court
awarded father primary physical custody. Council appealed.
The Supreme Court of Alaska held that council lacked standing
to appeal order modifying custody from which neither father nor
mother appealed.
Appeal dismissed.
9. Ebert v. Bruce L.
340 P.3d 1048 (Alaska 2014). Sometime in early 2007,
“Connie” approached Holly and William Ebert, a married couple
she knew from church, about adopting her child. The Eberts agreed
to the adoption. “Bruce” and Connie began a relationship in
August 2006. At some point, Connie told Bruce that she was
pregnant and was considering giving up the child for adoption.
Bruce objected to the adoption.
In late December 2007, Bruce filed a complaint for custody of
the child, “Timothy.” In July 2008 the Eberts filed an adoption
petition and intervened in Bruce’s custody case. The court granted
physical custody to the Eberts and semiweekly visitation to Bruce.
The court also ordered Bruce to pay $50 per month in child
support, retroactive to 2007; over the next four months, Bruce paid
a total of $200 in support.
In May 2009 the superior court held a trial on the adoption
petition and the custody dispute. In post-trial briefing, Bruce
argued that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) compelled the
court to grant Bruce custody of Timothy and prevented the Eberts
from adopting Timothy without Bruce’s consent. The Eberts
argued that Bruce could not invoke ICWA to prevent the adoption
because he was not a “parent” for purposes of the statute until he
established paternity in late 2008. They also argued that ICWA §
1912(d)’s “active efforts” provision did not apply in a private
adoption, particularly when the parent seeking to invoke ICWA
had no meaningful connection to any tribe.
The Supreme Court of Alaska found that under
AS 25.23.050(a)(2)(B), the consent of a noncustodial parent was
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not required for adoption if that parent unjustifiably fails to support
the child. But the superior court did not clearly err by concluding
that Bruce had justifiable cause for his failure to support the child.
10. In re S.B.C.
2014 MT 345, 377 Mont. 400, 340 P.3d 534. The Department
of Public Health and Human Services, Child and Family Services
Division (“Department”), sought permanent legal custody of
Indian child with right to consent to adoption. The district court
terminated both parents' rights to the child, and granted the
Department permanent legal custody with right to consent to
adoption. Mother and father appealed.
The Supreme Court of Montana held that: (1) good cause
existed to deny transfer of jurisdiction over custody matter
involving Indian child to the tribal court; (2) the proceeding had
not advanced to a stage that rendered the Tribe's motion for
transfer of jurisdiction to the tribal court untimely as a matter of
law; (3) Indian Child Welfare Act section, providing that "no
termination of parental rights may be ordered in the absence of
testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody
of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in
serious emotional or physical damage to the child," did not apply
where father never had custody of the child; and (4) the District
court did not abuse its discretion in terminating mother's parental
rights.
Affirmed.
B. January–March Cases
1. In re H.G.
234 184 Cal. Rptr. 3d 323 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015). At the start of
the dependency proceedings, the juvenile court and Ventura
County Human Services Agency believed the Indian Child Welfare
Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. 1901, did not apply to Eskimo families.
Father and mother appealed from the order terminating parental
rights to their two minor children and selecting adoption as the
permanent plan. Welf. & Inst. Code 366.26.
The court of appeal reversed.
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Evidence submitted for the first time on appeal established that
the children are Indian children under ICWA. The federal
definition of “Indian” includes “Eskimos and other aboriginal
peoples of Alaska.” The Noorvik Native Community, a federally
recognized Alaskan Indian tribe confirmed that the minors are tribe
members.
Before terminating parental rights to an Indian child, the
juvenile court must satisfy ICWA requirements, including finding
that “active efforts” were made to provide services designed to
prevent the breakup of the Indian family, and that parents’
continued custody of minors “is likely to result in serious
emotional or physical damage.”
Having found ICWA inapplicable, the juvenile court did not
consider these requirements before terminating parental rights;
NNC was not afforded an opportunity to intervene.
C. April–June Cases
1. J.N.T. v. Cullman Cnty. Dep’t. of Human Res.
181 So. 3d 353 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015). Department of Human
Resources (DHR) filed petition seeking to terminate the parental
rights of mother and father. The Cullman Juvenile Court, No. JU–
13–46.03, terminated parents’ parental rights, and mother
appealed.
The appellate court held that juvenile court failed to comply
with the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act when
it conducted termination of parental rights hearing less than 10
days after the tribe received notice of termination action.
Reversed and remanded.
D. July–August Cases
1. In re Natalie P.
No. D067689, 2015 WL 4072120 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 6, 2015).
Erika P. appealed following the jurisdictional and dispositional
hearing in the juvenile dependency case of her daughter, Natalie P.
Erika contended the juvenile court erred by finding the San Diego
County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency)
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substantially complied with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)
(25 U.S.C. § 1901) and ICWA did not apply.
The Agency conceded ICWA notice should have been sent to
the Cherokee tribe, the ICWA–030 form was incomplete, and
contained typographical errors, and a reversal and a limited remand
was necessary to effect and document proper ICWA notice.
The appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the
case to juvenile court with directions to order the Agency to:
(1) conduct an ICWA inquiry; (2) provide ICWA notice to any
tribes the inquiry identifies; and (3) file all required documentation
with the court. If, after proper notice, a tribe claims Natalie was an
Indian child, the court shall proceed in conformity with ICWA. If,
on the other hand, no tribe makes such a claim, the court shall
reinstate the judgment.

2. In re Adoption of T.A.W.
188 Wash. App. 799 (Jul. 7, 2015). Indian mother and her
husband petitioned to terminate non-Indian biological father’s
parental rights to Indian son and to allow husband to adopt son.
The superior court granted petition. Father appealed.
The appellate court held that: (1) father could raise the “active
efforts” requirement of Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) for the
first time on appeal; (2) termination provisions of ICWA applied to
non-Indian father; and (3) under Washington law, “active efforts”
requirement applies to a parent who has had custody of an Indian
child and has not expressly relinquished parental rights even if that
parent at some point in time has abandoned the child.
Reversed and remanded.
3. D.B. v. M.H.
No. E062459, 2015 WL 4629292 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2015).
M.H., the mother of J., D. and E., and E.F., the father of E.,
appealed from an order terminating their parental rights to D. and
E. The court rejected their contentions concerning the denial of
their petitions to modify the order terminating reunification
services and the court's finding that neither the beneficial parental
relationship exception to the statutory preference for adoption nor
the sibling relationship exception applied. However, the court
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agreed that conditional reversal was required in order for the
Riverside County Department of Public Social Services to comply
with its obligations under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978
(ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901).
The judgment terminating parental rights as to E. and D. was
reversed, and the case was remanded to the juvenile court with
directions to order the Riverside County Department of Public
Social Services to comply with the inquiry and notice requirements
of ICWA. If, after proper notice, the juvenile court finds that either
child is an Indian child as defined by ICWA, the court will proceed
in conformity with all provisions of ICWA. If, on the other hand,
the court finds after proper notice that either E. or D. is not an
Indian child, the judgment terminating parental rights shall be
reinstated as to that child.
The judgment is otherwise affirmed.
III. CONTRACTING
A. 2014 Cases
1. Gatzaros v. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians
575 F. App’x 549 (6th Cir. 2014). Ted and Maria Gatzaros
(Plaintiffs) appealed the dismissal of their suit against the Sault
Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians (the Tribe) and the Kewadin
Casinos Gaming Authority (the Authority). They sought to recover
approximately $74 million under a guaranty agreement that was
signed by the Tribe and the Authority. In the subscription
agreement, Kewadin Greektown Casino, LLC agreed to pay
Monroe Partners, LLC the amounts owed to Plaintiffs under the
redemption agreement as those payments came due.
The subscription agreement required Kewadin Greektown
Casino LLC to obtain a limited guaranty agreement from the Tribe
and the Authority binding them to pay the subscription amount in
the event that Kewadin Greektown Casino, LLC defaulted on its
obligations under the subscription agreement. On the same day the
redemption and subscription agreements were executed, the Tribe
and the Authority executed the guaranty agreement.
Kewadin Greektown Casino, LLC and Monroe Partners, LLC
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the Eastern District
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of Michigan. In 2012, Plaintiffs undertook efforts to recover nearly
$74 million in principal and interest still owed to them under the
redemption agreement. Plaintiffs’ counsel notified the Tribe and
the Authority by letter that Plaintiffs, standing in the shoes of
Monroe Partners, LLC as third-party beneficiaries to the guaranty
agreement, were modifying and accelerating the Funding
Obligations.
By unilateral action, Plaintiffs eliminated the limitations that
had set the necessary conditions precedent on the obligation of the
Tribe and the Authority to pay under the guaranty agreement if
Kewadin defaulted on the subscription agreement.
The court found that because the guaranty agreement was
unambiguous and the applicable law is clear, it had no basis on
which to remand the matter to the district court for the taking of
extrinsic evidence. One party to a contract may not unilaterally
rewrite the agreement to obtain more favorable terms. Contract
modification requires mutuality of consent, and that element was
missing.
The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the district court.
2. Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States
764 F.3d 51 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Indian tribe that operated health
care system for tribal members pursuant to self-determination
contract with Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS)
brought action against HHS, alleging breach of that contract. The
district court, 539 F. Supp. 2d 152, dismissed tribe’s claims in part,
and, 2008 WL 3919158, denied tribe’s motion to reconsider.
The appellate court, 614 F.3d 519, reversed and remanded. On
remand, the District court, 841 F. Supp. 2d 99, granted summary
judgment in favor of government. Tribe appealed. The appellate
court held that: (1) tribe’s miscalculation that it would be eligible
to participate in class action was not an extraordinary circumstance
warranting equitable tolling of applicable limitations period;
(2) alleged certainty of failure tribe faced in bringing its claims
was not an extraordinary circumstance that warranted equitable
tolling; and (3) series of events that tribe faced in bringing its
claims did not jointly amount to an extraordinary circumstance.
Ordered accordingly.
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3. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Burwell
70 F. Supp. 3d 534 (D.D.C. 2014). The Pyramid Lake Paiute
Tribe submitted a contract proposal to the Secretary of Health and
Human Services under the Act for funding to operate an
emergency medical services (EMS) program that the Indian Health
Service (IHS), a component of Health and Human Services, had
been funding directly since 1993. After receiving the Tribe’s
proposal, the Secretary discontinued the EMS program, which IHS
viewed as financially untenable, and denied the Tribe’s request on
the ground that the agency would not have funded the program
going forward. The tribe brought suit and moved for summary
judgment, arguing that the Secretary lacked authority to deny the
proposal.
The Court granted summary judgment in favor of the tribe
because the Secretary did not rest her decision on any of the
enumerated declination criteria available under the Indian Self
Determination and Education Assistance Act.
4. Farmer v. United States
No. CV–13–0251, 2014 WL 5419637 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 22,
2014). Before the court was the Motion To Dismiss filed by
Defendant United States. Plaintiff seeks to recover damages for
injuries sustained as a result of alleged negligence by Defendant,
Ron Shaffer. According to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, he
was working for Jones Brothers Construction in Inchelium,
Washington on October 25, 2011. Plaintiff was part of a
construction crew that was building a pole-style structure for the
local Fire Hall/EMT Unit. The structure was being constructed
pursuant to a contract between Confederated Tribes of The
Colville Indian Reservation and Jones Brothers Construction.
Plaintiff alleges that on that day, “[a]n EMT on duty for the
Colville Confederated Tribes EMT Unit, Ronald L. Shaffer, took it
upon himself to help the construction crew.” According to the First
Amended Complaint, while Plaintiff was on a ladder setting girder
trusses, “Mr. Shaffer negligently swung a sledge hammer and
struck [Plaintiff's] left hand with the sledge hammer causing [a]
fracture to his long finger and other injuries.”
Plaintiff sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA), 26 U.S.C. § 2674. He sued Mr. Shaffer and his wife,
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presumably, for common law negligence under the court's
supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), the United States moved to dismiss the
FTCA claim against it, asserting there was no subject matter
jurisdiction because Mr. Shaffer was not acting pursuant to the
contract between the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) and the Colville Confederated Tribes, and
furthermore, was not acting within the scope of his employment
with the Tribes.
The Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant United States of
America was denied. The FTCA claim against the United States
may proceed. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1), this was the
exclusive remedy and no claims may be maintained against Mr.
Shaffer individually. Accordingly, named Defendants Ron and
Rebecca Shaffer were dismissed with prejudice as were any claims
asserted against them under the FTCA or common law.
5. California v. Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians of Cal
No. 114–CV–01593, 2014 WL 5485940 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 29,
2014). The Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians of
California (Tribe) operates the Chukchansi Gold Resort and Casino
(Casino), in Madera County, California pursuant to a class III
gaming compact with the State of California (State). An intra-tribal
dispute exists among various Tribal members, which led to three or
more separate groups claiming leadership rights over the Tribe and
rights to control the Casino.
On October 9, 2014, this intra-tribal dispute led to an armed
conflict on the grounds of the Casino. As a result, on October 10,
2014, the State petitioned for, and this court issued, a temporary
restraining order, restraining and enjoining, among other things,
the operation of the Casino, any further attempts to repossess or
take control of the Casino, or the deployment of armed personnel
of any nature (other than State, County, or federal law
enforcement) within 1000 yards of the Casino and nearby
properties.
The State filed a lawsuit on October 10, 2014, alleging that the
actions taken by the various factions resulted in a breach of the
Compact's public health, safety, and welfare provisions. Also on
October 10, 2014, the National Indian Gaming Commission issued
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a Notice of Violation and Temporary Closure Order. The vying
factions have presented competing evidence of their own right to
govern the Tribe. The Lewis/Ayala Faction presented
correspondence from the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) reflecting
the BIA's determination to conduct business with the “last
uncontested Tribal Council” elected in December 2010, which the
Lewis/Ayala Faction claimed to represent.
The McDonald Faction likewise presented evidence purporting
to establish that it was the duly elected governing body of the tribe.
All parties and the court itself agreed that the court did not have
jurisdiction to adjudicate this governance dispute.
The court grants the State's request for a preliminary
injunction.
6. Maniilaq Association v. Burwell
72 F. Supp. 3d 227 (D.D.C. 2014). Indian tribe administering
healthcare systems through a self-determination compact and
annual funding agreements under the Indian Self–Determination
and Education Assistance Act (ISDEAA) filed suit against Indian
Health Service (IHS) seeking a declaration that a lease for one of
the clinics the tribe operated under its compact was incorporated
into its funding agreement as a matter of law. Both sides moved for
summary judgment.
The court held that: (1) letter sent to IHS by Indian tribe
constituted “final offer” for purposes of triggering 45-day time
period for agency to respond under ISDEAA; (2) clinic lease was
properly included in funding agreement pursuant to ISDEAA; and
(3) final offer concerning lease was deemed accepted when IHS
failed to respond to proposal within 45 days.
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was granted and
defendant's motion was denied.
7. Cloverdale Rancheria of Pomo Indians of Cal. v. Jewell
593 F. App’x 606 (9th Cir. 2014). Plaintiffs–Appellants are
five members of the Cloverdale Rancheria of Pomo Indians of
California (Tribe) who seek to compel Defendants–Appellees, the
Department of Interior and its officials (Department), to recognize
them as the Tribe's leadership and negotiate self-determination
contracts with them. The district court dismissed both of Plaintiffs–
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Appellants' complaints for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
lack of standing.
This case came after years of dispute about the governance of
the Tribe following its restoration to federally recognized status.
This history was known to the parties. Suffice it to say that over
the years various factions of the Tribe had asked the Department to
recognize them as the Tribe's duly-elected government. Plaintiffs–
Appellants failed to show why the federal courts could now
compel the Department to intervene in this long-running intratribal dispute.
The asserted duty was an obligation of the Department to
accept or reject Plaintiffs–Appellants' contract proposals in
conformity with the criteria set out in ISDA § 450f(a) and a series
of related regulations. This purported duty furnished subject matter
jurisdiction under the APA only if it was owed to Plaintiffs–
Appellants. It was not. Only an “Indian tribe” or a “tribal
organization” is authorized to submit a contract proposal. See 25
U.S.C. § 450f(a)(1)–(2).
Plaintiffs–Appellants are not entitled to act on behalf of a
federally recognized “Indian tribe,” however, because they are not
the Tribe's recognized governing body. For the same reason, even
if Plaintiffs–Appellants constituted a “tribal organization,” 25
U.S.C. § 450b(l), they were not entitled to submit a contract
proposal because they were not “authorized” to do so by the
Tribe's governing body, as § 450f(a)(2) requires.
For these reasons, Plaintiffs–Appellants lack statutory standing
to sue, even if ISDA, rather than the APA, supplied the necessary
subject matter jurisdiction, as the district court assumed it did.
Therefore, the district court did not err in dismissing Plaintiffs–
Appellants' fourth, fifth, and sixth claims. Finally, the district court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction under APA § 706(2) to hear
Plaintiffs–Appellants' sixth claim, that the Department acted
arbitrarily and capriciously, in abuse of its discretion, or otherwise
unlawfully when it returned Plaintiffs–Appellants' proposed ISDA
contracts and when it modified and renewed existing ISDA
contracts at the request of the Tribe's recognized governing body.
The Department's return of Plaintiffs–Appellants' contract
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proposals ddid not constitute “action”; rather, it was the equivalent
of a “return to sender” notification.
Even if it were action, Plaintiffs–Appellants did not exhaust
their administrative appeals. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v.
Hodel, 840 F.2d 675, 677 (9th Cir. 1988). The same is true of
Plaintiffs–Appellants' complaints about the Department's contract
negotiations with their rivals.
For the foregoing reasons, the court affirmed the district court's
dismissal of both of Plaintiffs–Appellants' complaints.
Affirmed.
8. Shirk v. United States
773 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2014). Motorcyclist injured as a driver
attempted to flee tribal police brought Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA) claims against the United States, claiming the two tribal
police officers acted negligently when they encountered the driver
off-reservation and that such negligence caused the motorcyclist's
injuries. The district court, 2010 WL 3419757, dismissed for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. The motorcyclist appealed.
As a matter of first impression, the appellate court held that in
order for an Indian tribe, tribal organization, or Indian contractor to
be deemed part of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, a court must
determine whether the allegedly tortious activity is encompassed
by the relevant federal contract or agreement with an Indian tribe,
and decide whether the allegedly tortious action falls within the
scope of the tortfeasor's employment under state law.
Vacated and remanded.
B. April–June Cases
1. Colbert v. United States
785 F.3d 1384 (11th Cir. 2015). The United States challenged
subject matter jurisdiction, namely, the district court’s partial
summary judgment ruling that, under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1346, and pursuant to the self-determination
contract entered into between the United States Department of
Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), and the Navajo Nation
Tribe, 25 U.S.C. § 450f1, Navajo Nation Department of Justice
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Attorney Kandis Martine was “deemed” an employee of the BIA
and afforded the full protection and coverage of the FTCA.
The district court determined that given Martine’s role in
connection with the Navajo Nation Child & Family Services
Program, and its efforts to oppose the adoption of a Navajo child
by a non-Navajo family in Florida state court, Martine was entitled
to protection under the FTCA. As a result, the district court
dismissed Martine from the lawsuit and held that the United States
was the proper party-defendant, 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(3). On
appeal, the United States contends the district court erred in
finding as a factual matter that Martine was “carrying out” work
under the self-determination contract.
The court of appeals held that the provision of FTCA coverage
to Martine did not constitute an improper extension of the waiver
of sovereign immunity. § 314 of the Indian Self-Determination Act
plainly extended the United States’ waiver of sovereign immunity
to Indian tribes, tribal organizations, Indian contractors and their
employees that are engaged in functions authorized under a
self-determination contract. Because Martine’s work fell within the
identifiable functions of the Navajo self-determination contract, the
district court’s application of the law to these facts comports with
sovereign immunity principles.
Affirmed.
2. Yurok Tribe v. Dep’t of the Interior
785 F.3d 1405 (Fed. Cir. 2015). The Yurok Tribe petitioned for
review of the Civilian Board of Contracting Appeals’ dismissal of
its action for approval of a self-determination contract. 2014 WL
718420. The tribe requested a contract for its Department of Public
Safety and Tribal Court. The Office of Self-Governance responded
timely directing the tribe to the Bureau’s Office of Justice Services
(“Bureau”). It is undisputed that the Bureau did not decline the
proposal within 90 days of receiving it. The Tribe appealed to both
the Board of Contract Appeals and the Interior Board of Indian
Appeals (IBIA) because of uncertainty whether the deemed
contract had arisen by operation of law or the appeal presented a
pre-award dispute. The IBIA action was stayed. The Board of
Contract Appeals granted the government’s Motion to Dismiss.
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The Federal Circuit could not affirm on either of the Board’s
grounds for dismissal, but found that other grounds to affirm
dismissal because the case presented a pre-award dispute. 25
U.S.C. § 450f(a)(2) provided that “the Secretary shall, within
90 days after receipt of the proposal, approve the proposal and
award the contract.” Both the statute and the regulations
distinguish between approval and award of the contract.
C. July–August Cases
1. Guidiville Rancheria of Cal. v. United States
No. 12-cv-1326, 2015 WL 4934408 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2015).
Defendant City of Richmond (City) filed a Motion for Attorneys'
Fees and Costs, seeking an award of attorneys' fees in the amount
of $2,149,370.002 jointly and severally against Upstream Point
Molate, LLC (Upstream) and the Guidiville Rancheria of
California (Tribe).
The City's claim for attorneys' fees was based on the contract
Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint, the Land Disposition
Agreement (LDA). The LDA underlid the claims between the
parties and was the basis upon which Plaintiffs alleged entitlement
to attorneys' fees in the complaint.
The Tribe argued vigorously that: (1) seeking fees under the
LDA did not constitute a waiver of its tribal sovereign immunity;
and (2) even if the filing of the instant lawsuit constituted a waiver,
the LDA still does not establish a basis for the City's fee request
since it was neither a party to the LDA nor had it been determined
to be a third party beneficiary of the LDA. To be sure, the LDA
was an agreement between the City and Upstream. However, the
allegations of the TAC convincingly stated the Tribe's position that
it was a third party beneficiary of the LDA, including the attorneys'
fees provision. The Tribe "d[id] not dispute that bringing the
lawsuit against the City binds it to the Court's determination . . .
that the [LDA] was not breached" and that, if the Tribe had
prevailed in a claim for money damages, the City could make an
offset claim against the Tribe for any monies the Tribe might have
owed the City.
The question was whether including a claim for attorneys' fees
under § 8.8 of the LDA and Civil Code § 1717 effected an express
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waiver for a reciprocal claim for attorneys' fees by the City if it
were to prevail in the litigation.
The court found, based upon these provisions of the LDA, and
upon the Tribe's affirmative assertion of rights under the attorneys'
fees provision in the LDA specifically, that the motion for
attorneys' fees was within the scope of waiver of immunity worked
by the filing of the lawsuit. The prevailing party's right to
attorneys' fees was the inevitable consequence of the Tribe's
conduct. By asserting the claim for attorneys' fees under Section
8.8 of the LDA, the Tribe took the risk that it would not prevail on
its claims under the agreement, and that liability for the prevailing
party attorneys' fees would be the result.
Therefore, the Tribe was jointly liable with Upstream for the
award of reasonable attorneys' fees. Based upon the foregoing, the
Court found that the City was entitled to attorneys' fees in the
amount of $1,927,317.50 as against Plaintiffs Upstream and
Guidiville Rancheria.
IV. EMPLOYMENT
A. 2014 Cases
1. EEOC v. Peabody Western Coal Co.
No. 12–17780, 2014 WL 4783087 (9th Cir. Sept. 26, 2014).
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought
action against company that mined coal on Hopi and Navajo
reservations under leases with the tribes, and against tribe, alleging
lease requirements that company gave preference in employment
to Navajo Indians was national origin discrimination in violation of
Title VII. Company impleaded the Secretary of the Interior and
counterclaimed against the EEOC for declaratory relief.
The district court denied EEOC’s motion to supplement the
record and, 2012 WL 5034276, granted summary judgment for the
Secretary and tribe on the ground that the tribal hiring preferences
in the leases were permissible under Title VII. EEOC appealed.
The appellate court held that: (1) on question of first
impression, Title VII’s prohibition against national origin
discrimination did not prohibit the leases’ tribal hiring preferences;
(2) district court did not abuse its discretion by denying, as
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untimely, EEOC’s request to supplement the record; and (3) EEOC
waived on appeal its claim that company violated Title VII’s
record-keeping requirements.
Affirmed.
B. January–March Cases
1. Coppe v. Sac & Fox Casino Healthcare Plan
No. 14–2598, 2015 WL 1137733 (D. Kan. Mar. 13, 2015).
Before the court was a motion brought by defendant Sac & Fox
Casino Healthcare Plan to dismiss or stay for failure to exhaust
tribal remedies. The motion asked the court to rule as a matter of
comity that before bringing a claim in federal court, plaintiff must
bring an ERISA action for recovery of insurance benefits under the
casino’s nongovernmental plan in tribal court.
The court assumed for purposes of the order that plaintiff was
not a member of the Sac & Fox Tribe and that the Plan was not a
“governmental plan” as defined in ERISA.
The amended complaint in this case alleged: Plaintiff was an
employee of the Sac & Fox Casino. In the summer of 2011,
plaintiff, while still an employee of the casino, incurred substantial
medical expenses in relation to a pregnancy and the birth of a
premature baby. Plaintiff asserted that some or all of these
expenses charged to her are the responsibility of defendant Sac &
Fox Casino Healthcare Plan, which, she alleged, is an employee
welfare benefit plan governed by ERISA.
Defendants refused to pay what plaintiff asserted is owed
pursuant to the provisions of the Plan. Plaintiff asserted that she
had exhausted her administrative remedies under the Plan and,
specifically, that defendants Benefit Management, Inc. and the
Plan had denied plaintiff’s claims for payment. Plaintiff further
alleged in response to the motion to dismiss that the Plan stated
that a Plan member may file a claim for benefits “in a state or
federal court” and that there was no reference to tribal courts in the
Plan.
This allegation was not disputed in defendant Plan’s reply
brief. The Sac & Fox Casino is a non-corporate operating arm of
the tribe. The casino maintained a self-funded plan of healthcare
benefits. Money to fund the plan came from the casino’s general
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operating expenses. A judgment against the plan would likely
come directly from the tribal treasury or the casino’s general
operating fund.
The court held that Congress preempted the tribe’s
adjudicatory authority over ERISA claims and, therefore,
exhaustion of tribal remedies was not required.
The court denied defendant Plan’s motion to dismiss.
2. Unite Here Local 19 v. Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi
Indians
101 F. Supp. 3d 929 (E.D. Cal. 2015). Through this action,
Petitioner Unite Here Local 19 (Petitioner) sought confirmation
and enforcement of a labor arbitration award against Respondents
Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians and Chukchansi
Economic Development Authority (collectively, “Respondents”).
The parties agreed to submit grievances over the terminations
of Casino employees Jarrod Woodcock and Mae Pitman to
arbitration. Arbitrator Patrick Halter issued a decision on February
24, 2014, which he served on counsel for the parties by email on
the same day.
The arbitrator’s decision concluded: “In sum, grievants
Woodcock and Pitman were suspended and discharged without just
cause. The remedy to cure the numerous violations of the CBA is
reinstatement with a make whole remedy that includes backpay
with interest, tips for Woodcock, restoration of seniority,
contributions to retirement, reimbursement of health insurance
premiums and expenses, and any other employment benefits
unjustly denied due to their wrongful suspensions and discharges.
Although the Court had issued a preliminary injunction order
that restrains operation of the Casino, the order made an exception
for “[p]ayments in the ordinary course of business.” Respondents’
compliance with the arbitration award fell within that explicit
exception.
The court granted Petitioner’s Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings.
The arbitration award was confirmed and enforced.
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C. April–June Cases
1. Harris v. San Manuel Band of Mission Indians
EDCV 14-02365 SJO, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86944 (C.D.
Cal. Apr. 29, 2015). Plaintiff Harris was employed by Defendants
as a casino security guard. He was terminated on February 16,
2013. Plaintiff reported instances of sexual harassment and
suspected drug use in the workplace to supervisors and alleged that
he was wrongfully terminated for the complaints. Plaintiff brought
a single state law cause of action for wrongful termination in
violation of public police.
Before the Court was Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(7). Plaintiff argued that the
Court had subject matter jurisdiction because Defendants were
subject to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 and because
of the Compact where Defendants waived sovereign immunity and
agreed to “comply with standards no less stringent than federal
workplace and occupational health and safety standards.” Am.
Compact §§ 10.2(d), (e).
The court found that the employment law action is not a claim
to enforce the Compact, but rather one such ancillary issue over
which federal courts lack jurisdiction and that plaintiff failed to
allege how a state law claim for wrongful termination constituted a
breach of the Compact. The Compact references only federal
workplace and occupational health and safety standards, and
Plaintiff had not alleged violations of any federal law or standard.
The Court found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and
granted Defendants Motion to Dismiss and dismissed Plaintiff’s
Complaint without leave to amend.
2. Longo v. Seminole Indian Casino-Immokalee
110 F. Supp. 3d 1252 (M.D. Fla. 2015). This matter was before
the court on Defendant Seminole Indian Casino–Immokalee’s
Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff Stanley Longo is a former employee
of Defendant. Defendant Seminole Indian Casino-Immokalee is a
business wholly owned and operated by the Seminole Tribe of
Florida.
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In October 2008, Defendant hired Plaintiff to serve as a
security guard at its casino. Plaintiff enjoyed success in this
position until January 2013, when a patron of the casino started to
sexually harass, stalk, and physically touch him on a continual
basis. Because these actions created a hostile work environment,
Plaintiff sought to remedy this situation by reporting the incidents
to Defendant. But Defendant failed to take any corrective action.
Instead, Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s employment one month
later, stating that Plaintiff “was ‘discourteous to team members.”
Based on these facts, Plaintiff brought the instant action against
Defendant, asserting four counts: (Count 1) Violation of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; (Count 2) Violation of the Florida
Civil Rights Act of 1992; (Count 3) Violation of Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964; and (Count 4) Violation of the Florida
Civil Rights Act of 1992.
Defendant argued that tribal immunity divested the court of
subject matter jurisdiction because the Seminole Tribe of Florida
was a federally recognized tribe immune from Plaintiff’s statutory
claims under Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992.
The court held that the Seminole Tribe of Florida was a
federally recognized Indian tribe that enjoyed sovereign immunity
from this action and granted Defendant Seminole Indian Casino–
Immokalee’s Motion to Dismiss.
3. Boricchio v. Casino
Nos. 14–818, 14–819, 14–820, 14–821, 14–822, 2015 WL
3648698 (E.D. Cal. June 10, 2015). These separate but related
cases involved an employment discrimination dispute between
Plaintiffs and their former employer, the Defendant Chicken Ranch
Casino (Casino).
In each complaint, Plaintiffs alleged three causes of action for
violation of 29 U.S.C. § 621. (Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA)) against the Casino and the Chicken Ranch Rancheria
of Me–Wuk Indians of California (Tribe), Lloyd Mathiesen
(Mathiesen), and James Smith (Smith) (collectively “Defendants”).
Defendants moved to dismiss each complaint under Rule 12(b)(1)
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and alternatively under Rule
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Each Plaintiff was employed at
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the Casino, but none of the Plaintiffs were members of the Tribe.
Each Plaintiff was over the age of 50.
The court found that Defendants established that they may
invoke tribal immunity, and Plaintiffs failed to show either a
waiver or abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity. Therefore,
Defendants were entitled to tribal sovereign immunity. The Court
found it was deprived of subject matter jurisdiction, and dismissed
the case.
The motions to dismiss were granted and the complaint of each
Plaintiff was dismissed without leave to amend.
D. July–August Cases
1. Williams v. Poarch Band of Creek Indians
No. 14–594, 2015 WL 4104611 (S.D. Ala. July 8, 2015). This
action was before the court on Plaintiff’s Complaint and
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff Williams is a former
employee of the Poarch Band of Creek Indians (PBCI). Her
Complaint asserted claims of “violations of civil rights (age
discrimination) and year of service disparate treatment.”
Defendant contended that absent congressional authorization or
waiver, PBCI is entitled to tribal sovereign immunity. Defendant
further contended that because the Age Discrimination
Employment Act (ADEA) did not abrogate the doctrine of tribal
sovereign immunity, PBCI maintained its immunity rendering the
court powerless to hear Plaintiff’s Complaint.
Additionally, Defendant contended that not only was
congressional authorization or waiver lacking, but the ADEA was
silent with respect to allegations addressing congressional
authorization of private lawsuits under the ADEA, which silence
must be construed in PBCI’s favor.
The Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge made under 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) was adopted as the opinion of the court.
The court granted Defendant Poarch Band of Creek Indians’
Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
dismissed the Complaint.
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V. ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS
A. 2014 Cases
1. Yount v. Salazar
Nos. CV11–8171, CV12–8038, CV12–8042, CV12–8075,
2014 WL 4904423 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2014). This case concerned
a withdrawal by the Secretary of the Interior of more than one
million acres of federal land from uranium mining.
The withdrawn land surrounded Grand Canyon National Park
and included a North Parcel of approximately 550,000 acres, an
East Parcel of approximately 135,000 acres, and a South Parcel of
some 322,000 acres. The withdrawal would close these lands to the
exploration and development of uranium mining claims for 20
years, although mining of a few existing claims would be
permitted.
Plaintiffs in this case included counties, associations,
companies, and an individual with interests in uranium mining.
They asked the court to set aside the withdrawal as illegal under
several federal statutes.
Plaintiffs' claims under the FLPMA and the Administrative
Procedures Act remained. Plaintiff Yount also alleged that the
Withdrawal's stated purpose of protecting the cultural and religious
heritage of Native American tribes violated the Establishment
Clause of the United States Constitution.
Ultimately, the question in this case was whether DOI, when
faced with uncertainty due to a lack of definitive information, and
a low risk of significant environmental harm, could proceed
cautiously by withdrawing land for a period of time under the
FLPMA.
The court could find no legal principle that prevented DOI
from acting in the face of uncertainty. Nor could the court
conclude that the Secretary abused his discretion or acted
arbitrarily, capriciously, or in violation of law when he chose to err
on the side of caution in protecting a national treasure—Grand
Canyon National Park.
It was ordered that Defendants' motions for summary judgment
are granted. Plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment was denied.

424

American Indian Law Journal

[Vol. 4:390

B. July–August Cases
1. Pit River Tribe v. Bureau of Land Management
793 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2015). Indian tribe and environmental
organizations brought actions alleging that Bureau of Land
Management’s (BLM) continuation of geothermal leases violated
Geothermal Steam Act, National Environmental Policy Act,
National Historic Preservation Act, and federal government’s
fiduciary trust obligation to Indian tribes.
After cases were consolidated, the district court entered
judgment on pleadings in BLM’s favor, and plaintiffs appealed.
The appellate court held that: (1) tribe had standing to bring
private cause of action under Geothermal Steam Act, and (2) fact
issues remained as to whether BLM used improper legal standard
in continuing leases.
2. Organized Village of Kake v. U.S. Dept. of Agric.
795 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2015). Village and others brought action
against Department of Agriculture, alleging that exemption of
national forest from roadless rule violated the National
Environmental Policy Act and the Administrative Procedure Act,
and the state of Alaska intervened as a defendant.
The district court, 776 F. Supp. 2d 960, granted summary
judgment to village. Alaska appealed. The appellate court, 746
F.3d 970, reversed and remanded.
On rehearing en banc, the appellate court held that: (l) Alaska
demonstrated that it would suffer an injury in fact if roadless rule
was implemented; (2) Department did not provide substantial
justification or a reasoned explanation for its change in policy; and
(3) roadless rule would remain in effect.
Affirmed.
VI. FISHERIES, WATER, FERC, BOR
A. 2014 Cases
1. San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Jewell
52 F. Supp. 3d 1020 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (from the opinion). This
case concerned the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation’s (Reclamation)
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decision to make certain “Flow Augmentation” releases (FARs) of
water beginning on August 13, 2013 from Lewiston Dam, a feature
of the Trinity River Division (TRD) of the Central Valley Project
(CVP). The stated purpose of the releases was to “reduce the
likelihood, and potentially reduce the severity, of any Ich epizootic
event that could lead to associated fish die off in 2013” in the
lower Klamath River.
Plaintiffs, the San Luis & Delta Mendota Water Authority
(Authority) and Westlands Water District (Westlands), alleged that
by approving and implementing the 2013 FARs, Reclamation and
its parent agency, the U.S. Department of the Interior (Interior)
(collectively, “Federal Defendants”), violated various provisions of
the Central Valley Project Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 102–575,
106 Stat. 4700 (1992), and the Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C.
§ 383. Federal Defendants offered only one independent legal
authority for the 2013 FARs: the 1955 Act.
The court found that the 1955 Act was likewise limited in
scope to the Trinity River basin, so did not provide authorization
for Federal Defendants to implement the 2013 FARs to benefit fish
in the lower Klamath.
Therefore, Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was
granted as to the distinct issue of whether the 1955 Act provided
authorization to implement the 2013 FARs.
2. Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians of
Wis. v. Wisconsin
769 F.3d 543 (7th Cir. 2014). Indian tribe brought action
alleging that state statute prohibiting members of tribes from
hunting deer at night on ceded territory outside tribes’ reservations
violated its treaty rights. After entry of judgment in state’s favor,
775 F. Supp. 321, the district court denied tribe’s motion for relief
from judgment, and tribe appealed.
The appellate court held that: (1) tribe’s delay in filing motion
was not reason to deny relief; and (2) reconsideration of tribe’s
motion was warranted.
Reversed and remanded.
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3. San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth.. v. Locke
776 F.3d 971 (9th Cir. 2014). State water districts brought
actions challenging National Marine Fisheries Service's (NMFS)
biological opinion under the Endangered Species Act (ESA),
concerning effect of two California water projects on endangered
fish species.
After actions were consolidated, the district court, 791 F. Supp.
2d 802, granted summary judgment in part for plaintiffs and
defendants, and remanded action. All parties appealed.
The appellate court held that: (1) district court abused its
discretion by improperly admitting extra-record declarations when
reviewing opinion; (2) NMFS acted within its discretion, in issuing
opinion, by using non-scaled data model to set river flows;
(3) NMFS did not act arbitrarily nor capriciously by determining
projects' continued operations were likely to jeopardize viability
and essential habitat of species; and (4) various recommendations
and requirements of NMFS in its opinion were not arbitrary or
capricious, in violation of Administrative Procedure Act.
Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.
B. January–March Cases
1. United States v. Brown
777 F.3d 1025 (8th Cir. 2015). Members of Chippewa Indian
tribe were indicted under the Lacey Act, which makes it unlawful
to sell any fish taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of
any Indian tribal law. Tribal members moved to dismiss
indictments on the ground that their prosecution violated fishing
rights reserved under the 1837 Treaty between the United States
and the Chippewa.
The district court, 2013 WL 6175202, granted motion. United
States appealed.
The appellate court held that: (1) tribal members had
usufructuary rights protecting their right to fish and sell fish, and
(2) Lacey Act did not abrogate tribal members’ usufructuary rights
to sell fish caught on Indian reservation.
Affirmed.
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2. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley
Water Dist.
223 F.3d 1041 (C.D. Cal. 2015). The Agua Caliente sued the
Coachella Valley Water District (CVWD) and the Desert Water
Agency (DWA), seeking, among other things, a declaration that
their federal reserved water rights, which arose under the doctrine
of Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 28 S. Ct. 207, 52 L. Ed.
340 (1908), extended to groundwater. The parties, plus the United
States as Plaintiff-intervenor, all filed motions for partial summary
judgment.
The CVWD was a county water district and was responsible
for developing groundwater wells in the Coachella valley and
extracting groundwater.
The court concluded the Tribe’s federal reserved water rights
may have included groundwater, but the Tribe’s aboriginal right of
occupancy was extinguished long ago, so the Tribe has no
derivative right to groundwater on that basis.
The court (1) granted partial summary judgment to the Agua
Caliente and the United States on the claim that the government
impliedly reserved appurtenant water sources—including
underlying groundwater—when it created the Tribe’s reservation;
and (2) granted partial summary judgment to Defendants regarding
the Tribe’s aboriginal title claims because the Land Claims Act of
1851, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, effectively
extinguished any such right.

C. April–June Cases
1. Hopi Tribe v. United States
782 F.3d 662 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Indian tribe brought action
against federal government, alleging that Bureau of Indian Affairs
failed to ensure that water supply on tribe’s reservation contained
safe levels of arsenic, and sought to recover damages for breach of
trust. The Court of Federal Claims, 113 Fed. Cl. 43, dismissed the
action. Tribe appealed.
The appellate court held that: (1) neither Executive Order of
1882 nor Act of 1958 established any enforceable substantive
right; (2) by holding reserved water rights in trust under Act of
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1958, fiduciary duty could not be inferred under the Winters
doctrine that Congress intended the United States to be responsible
for providing water infrastructure and treatment needed to
eliminate naturally occurring contaminants such as arsenic on
Indian reservation; and (3) Congress did not expressly accept
common-law fiduciary duty to manage water resources of Indian
reservation through statutes that only required the United States to
assist in provision of safe drinking water, but did not restrict tribe
from managing resource itself.
Affirmed.
2. United States v. Washington
No. C70–9213, 2015 WL 3451316 (W.D. Wash. May 29,
2015). Pursuant to Section 9 of the Shellfish Implementation Plan
(SIP), the Squaxin Island Tribe filed a request for dispute
resolution regarding the Tribe’s right to take shellfish and alleged
interference with that right by Russell Norris d/b/a Russ’ Shellfish.
The court found that Russell Norris violated the notice
requirement of § 6.3 of the SIP as well as applicable Harvest Plans.
He was not, however, liable as a matter of law, for the actions or
inactions of Great Northwest. The Squaxin Island Tribe was
entitled to an equitable remedy which would establish the pounds
of Manila clams it was entitled, in the future, to recover from Russ
Norris.
3. United States v. Washington
No. C70–9213, 2015 WL 3504872 (W.D. Wash. June 3, 2015).
This matter was before the court on Cross–Motions for Summary
Judgment by the Suquamish Indian Tribe (the “Suquamish”) and
the Upper Skagit Indian Tribe (“Upper Skagit”), as well as the
Upper Skagit’s Motion to Strike Exhibits. The Upper Skagit
initiated this subproceeding by filing a Request for Determination
on January 16, 2015, seeking a determination that the usual and
accustomed fishing grounds (U&A) for the Suquamish Tribe did
not include Samish Bay, Chuckanut Bay, and a portion of Padilla
Bay (Disputed Areas), where the Upper Skagit had its own courtapproved U&A.
The court found and ordered as follows: (1) The Suquamish
Indian Tribe’s Motion for Summary Judgment was denied. (2) The

2016]

Case Law on American Indians: 2014–2015

429

Upper Skagit Indian Tribe’s Motion for Summary Judgment was
granted. (3) The Upper Skagit’s Motion to Strike Exhibits was
denied. (4) As the Suquamish Indian Tribe’s U&A fishing grounds
and stations did not include the Disputed Areas at issue here, the
Suquamish Indian Tribe was permanently enjoined from issuing
regulations for and/or fishing in the waters of the Disputed Areas.
D. July–August Cases
1. United States v. Washington
No. C70–9213, 2015 WL 4405591 (W.D. Wash. July 17, 2015)
(From the Order). This matter comes before the court after remand
from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and upon the Jamestown
S’Klallam Tribe’s, Port Gamble S’Klallam Tribe’s, and Lower
Elwha Klallam Indian Tribe’s (collectively S’Klallam), and
Lummi Nation’s (the Lummi) Motions for Summary Judgment.
The S’Klallam requested that the court grant summary judgment
on the issues presented in their Request for Determination (RFD)
filed November 8, 2011.
The RFD asked the court to find that the actions of the Lummi
in fishing in the “case area” was not in conformity with Final
Decision I.
The matter having been fully briefed, the court granted
S’Klallam’s motions for summary judgment and denied Lummi’s
motion for summary judgment.
2. Tulalip Tribes v. Suquamish Indian Tribe
794 F.3d 1129 (9th Cir. 2015). Tulalip Indian Tribes filed
request for determination that the inland marine waters east of
Admiralty Inlet but west of Whidbey Island, as well as Saratoga
Passage, Penn Cove, Holmes Harbor, Possession Sound, Port
Susan, Tulalip Bay, and Port Gardner, were not within Suquamish
Indian Tribe’s “usual and accustomed fishing grounds,” as
established by treaty between United States and Indian tribes in
Western Washington under which tribes reserved the right to fish
at all usual and accustomed grounds.
The district court, 2015 WL 3504872, 2013 WL 3897783,
granted Tulalip’s summary judgment motion in part. Tulalip
appealed.
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The appellate court held that: (1) Suquamish Indian Tribe’s
treaty right of taking fish at “usual and accustomed fishing grounds
and stations” was not intended to exclude waters east of Whidbey
Island, and (2) Suquamish Indian Tribe’s treaty right was not
intended to exclude waters west of Whidbey Island.
Affirmed.
3. Flathead Irrigation Dist. v. Jewell
121 F. Supp. 3d 1008 (D. Mont. 2015). Plaintiffs Flathead
Irrigation District (“FID”) and Flathead Joint Board of Control,
filed this action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against
Defendants, collectively “the United States,” for claims arising out
of the United States’ recent and historical actions with respect to
the Flathead Irrigation Project.
The United States moved to dismiss all of the claims. After
briefing on the United States’ motion to dismiss was completed,
Plaintiffs’ moved the court for leave to file their Second Amended
Complaint.
The court granted the motion to dismiss and denied the motion
for leave to file the Second Amended Complaint.
VII. GAMING
A. 2014 Cases
1. Bettor Racing, Inc. v. Nat’l Indian Gaming Comm’n
47 F. Supp. 3d 912 (D.S.D. 2014). A parimutuel betting
business and its president brought action against the National
Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC), claiming that the NIGC's
imposition of a $5 million fine for violations of the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act (IGRA) violated the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA), the Eighth Amendment, and the procedural due process
protections. An Indian Tribe intervened. All parties moved for
summary judgment.
The district court held that: (1) the NIGC did not act arbitrarily
nor capriciously in finding that the business violated the IGRA by
operating without an approved management contract; (2) the NIGC
did not act arbitrarily nor capriciously in finding that the business
violated the IGRA by operating under two unapproved
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amendments to a management contract; (3) the NIGC did not act
arbitrarily nor capriciously in finding that the business violated the
IGRA by having a propriety interest in an Indian casino; (4) the
NIGC did not act arbitrarily nor capriciously in imposing a $5
million fine; (5) the business's procedural due process rights were
not violated; (6) the court had subject matter jurisdiction to address
the Eighth Amendment claim; and (7) the business failed to make a
prima facie showing that the $5 million fine was grossly
disproportionate.
NIGC's and Tribe's motions granted, and business's motion
denied.
2. Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians v. Brown
178 Cal. Rptr. 3d 563 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (From the opinion).
Plaintiff Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians (the Picayune
Tribe) owns and operates a resort and casino on its rancheria lands
in Madera County.
In 2005, another tribe—the North Fork Rancheria of Mono
Indians (the North Fork Tribe)—submitted a request to the United
States Department of the Interior asking the department to acquire
approximately 305 acres of land in Madera County adjacent to
State Route 99 so the North Fork Tribe could develop its own
resort and casino there. The land on which the North Fork Tribe
wanted to build its casino is approximately 40 miles away from the
North Fork Tribe’s rancheria lands and approximately 30 miles
away from the Picayune Tribe’s casino.
Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, casino gaming on
lands acquired for a tribe by the Secretary of the Interior after
October 17, 1988, is generally prohibited, subject to certain
exceptions.
One of those exceptions is if “the Secretary, after consultation
with the Indian tribe and appropriate State and local officials,
including officials of other nearby Indian tribes, determines that a
gaming establishment on newly acquired lands would be in the
best interest of the Indian tribe and its members, and would not be
detrimental to the surrounding community, but only if the
Governor of the State in which the gaming activity is to be
conducted concurs in the Secretary’s determination.” It is the
Governor’s concurrence that was at the heart of this case.
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The Department of the Interior conducted an environmental
review of the casino project proposed by the North Fork Tribe
under federal law and issued a final environmental impact
statement in 2009.
In September 2011, the Secretary of the Interior’s delegate
asked Governor Brown to concur in that determination. Despite
requests by the Picayune Tribe and others that he prepare an
environmental impact report (EIR) under CEQA before acting,
Governor Brown issued his concurrence in the two-part
determination without preparing or considering the preparation of
an EIR. The following day, the Governor executed a tribal-state
gaming compact with the North Fork Tribe. The Secretary’s
representative took the land into trust for the tribe in February
2013.
Later that year, the Legislature ratified the compact. The
Picayune Tribe asserted that Governor Brown’s concurrence in the
two-part determination constituted an “approval” of a “project”
under CEQA that “must be the subject of the CEQA environmental
review process.” Among other things, the Governor and the real
party in interest argued that as a matter of law the Governor was
not a “public agency” for CEQA purposes and therefore his
concurrence in the two-part determination was not subject to
CEQA. The trial court agreed.
Accordingly, the court sustained the demurrers without leave to
amend and entered a judgment of dismissal. The Picayune Tribe
timely appealed.
The appellate court affirmed the judgment.
3. Cal. Valley Miwok Tribe v. Cal. Gambling Control Comm’n
180 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014). Tribe brought
action against Gambling Control Commission for declaratory,
injunctive, and writ relief to require the Commission to pay over
the Revenue Sharing Trust Fund (RSTF) funds to the tribe's
purported chairperson. A rival purported chairperson intervened.
The superior court, No. 37–2008–00075326, stayed the
proceedings. Tribe petitioned for writ of mandate. The appellate
court granted the petition, 2012 WL 6584030. The Superior Court
granted summary judgment for the Commission. Tribe appealed.
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The appellate court held that the Commission properly held
RSTF funds in trust for tribe pending resolution of federal court
lawsuit to recognize a tribal leader.
Affirmed.
4. Oklahoma v. Hobia
775 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2014). These matters were before the
court on the State of Oklahoma's Petition for Rehearing or
Rehearing En Banc. The court granted panel rehearing to the
extent of the amendments made to the revised Opinion attached to
the order. The clerk of court was directed to vacate the decision
issued originally on November 10, 2014 and to reissue the attached
version. The court once again addressed the subject of Indian
gaming and, following the lead of the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024
(2014), emphasize that any federal cause of action brought
pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) of the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act (IGRA) to enjoin class III gaming activity must
allege and ultimately establish that the gaming “[wa]s located on
Indian lands.” 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii). If, as here, the
complaint alleges that the challenged class III gaming activity was
occurring somewhere other than on “Indian lands” as defined in
IGRA, the action fails to state a valid claim for relief under
§ 2710(d)(7)(A)(ii) and must be dismissed.
The State of Oklahoma filed this action against officials of the
Kialegee Tribal Town, a federally recognized Indian tribe in
Oklahoma, claiming that they, along with a federally-chartered
corporation related to the tribe and a related Oklahoma limited
liability company, were attempting to construct and ultimately
operate a class III gaming facility on a parcel of land in Broken
Arrow, Oklahoma, that was neither owned nor governed by the
Tribal Town, in violation of both IGRA and a state-tribal gaming
compact. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, but the
district court denied their motion.
The district court subsequently granted a preliminary
injunction in favor of the State that prohibited defendants from
constructing or operating a class III gaming facility on the property
at issue.
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Defendants appealed. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291, the court concluded that, in light of Bay Mills, the
State has failed to state a valid claim for relief.
The court therefore reversed and remanded to the district court
with instructions to vacate its preliminary injunction and to dismiss
the State's complaint.
B. January–March Cases
1. Redding Rancheria v. Jewell
776 F.3d 706 (9th Cir. 2015). Indian tribe sued Department of
Interior (DOI), challenging decision that, pursuant to DOI’s
regulations, tribe’s parcels of undeveloped riverfront lands, located
several miles outside tribe’s reservation, were ineligible for
gaming if DOI took parcels into trust by which parcels would
become Indian lands under restored lands exception to general
prohibition in Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) against
gaming on Indian lands taken into trust after date of IGRA’s
passage. The district court granted summary judgment for DOI.
Tribe appealed.
The appellate court held that: (1) Secretary reasonably
implemented restored lands exception; (2) canon did not apply that
statute had to be interpreted liberally in favor of Indians to extent
that it was not clear; (3) Secretary provided sufficient explanation
for its alleged change of policy; and (4) remand was warranted.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
C. April–June Cases
1. Tulalip Tribes of Wash. v. Washington
783 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2015). Indian tribe brought action
against the State of Washington, seeking a declaration that the
State had breached the “most-favored tribe” clause of a TribalState Indian gaming compact. The District court, 2013 WL
2253668, granted summary judgment to the State. The Indian
Tribe appealed.
The appellate court held that the State was not required to
amend its Tribal-State Indian gaming compact to provide an
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alternative mechanism for a Tribe to obtain additional video player
terminals.
Affirmed.
2. Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation,
784 F.3d 1076 (7th Cir. 2015). Wisconsin brought action
against Indian tribe to stop the tribe from offering electronic poker
at its gaming facility. Parties cross-moved for summary judgment.
The District court granted state’s motion. Tribe appealed.
The appellate court held that Wisconsin could not interfere
with tribe’s decision to conduct nonbanked poker on tribal lands.
Reversed.
3. Duluth v. Fond Du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa
785 F.3d 1207 (8th Cir. 2015). City sued band of Native
American tribe, alleging breach of contractual obligations created
when city and band agreed to establish casino in city’s downtown,
and also seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. After it was
compelled to arbitrate amount of withheld taxes owed to city, tribe
moved for relief from final order.
The district court entered summary judgment barring tribe from
challenging agreement’s validity, 708 F. Supp. 2d 890, entered
order compelling tribe to arbitrate amount of rent to be paid to city
for extension term, 2011 WL 1832786, and granted in part and
denied in part tribe’s motion for relief, 830 F. Supp. 2d 712. Tribe
appealed.
The appellate court, 702 F.3d 1147, affirmed in part, reversed
in part, and remanded. On remand, tribe moved for relief from
judgment. The district court, 977 F. Supp. 2d 944, denied motion.
Tribe appealed.
The appellate court held that district court was required to
consider intent of Congress in Indian Gaming Regulatory Act to
ensure that primary beneficiaries of Indian gaming operations were
to be tribes.
4. Fort Sill Apache Tribe v. Nat’l Indian Gaming Comm’n
103 F. Supp. 3d 113 (D.D.C. 2015). Tribe brought action under
Administrative Procedure Act to compel National Indian Gaming
Commission (NIGC) to issue decision on tribe’s appeal of notice
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of violation issued by NISC’s chairman alleging that tribe had
violated Indian Gaming Regulatory Act by gaming on Indian lands
ineligible for gaming. NIGC moved to dismiss.
The district court held that: (1) action fell within scope of
Administrative Procedure Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity;
(2) court had subject matter jurisdiction over action; and (3) notice
of violation was not final agency action.
Motion granted in part and denied in part.
5. Cayuga Nation v. Tanner
No. 5:14–CV–1317, 2015 WL 2381301 (N.D.N.Y May 19,
2015). On October 28, 2014, plaintiffs, Cayuga Nation and John
Does 1–20 (plaintiffs), filed this action against defendants Howard
Tanner, Code Enforcement Officer for the Village of Union
Springs, New York (Village) and the Village itself (collectively
“defendants”). Also on that date, plaintiffs filed a motion for
preliminary injunction and requested a temporary restraining order.
Generally, plaintiffs claimed the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (IGRA), preempted the Village’s
efforts to enforce local anti-gaming laws.
In 2004, the Cayuga Nation opened Lakeside Entertainment on
land it claimed to be within the limits of its reservation. The
facility closed in October 2005. Three Cayuga Nation members
began orchestrating the reopening of the facility in 2010. They
obtained an architect’s report stating that the use of Lakeside
Entertainment for Class II gaming complied with state and local
zoning, land use, and building codes.
Defendants argued that the complaint must be dismissed
because: (1) Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring this action; and
(2) the action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
As a threshold issue of subject matter jurisdiction, plaintiffs
must have establish standing under Article III of the Constitution.
They failed to meet that burden. Whether the Nation 2006
Council—which was the recognized leadership entity of the
Cayuga Nation—properly authorized this lawsuit was an issue that
necessarily required the interpretation and application of internal
Nation law. Therefore, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
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Therefore, it was ordered that (1) defendants’ cross-motion to
dismiss was granted; (2) plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary
injunction was denied as moot; (3) the complaint was dismissed in
its entirety; and (4) the temporary restraining order was vacated.
6. Big Lagoon Rancheria v. California
789 F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 2015). Indian tribe brought action
alleging that state violated the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
(IGRA) by failing to negotiate in good faith for a casino on tribal
trust land. The district court granted summary judgment for tribe,
759 F. Supp. 2d 1149, but, subsequently, granted state’s motion for
stay pending appeal, 2012 WL 298464. Both parties appealed. The
appellate court, 741 F.3d 1032, reversed and remanded.
On petition for rehearing en banc, the appellate court affirmed.
Unlike Carcieri, this was a belated collateral attack on the
Secretary’s decision to take land into trust. The State did not bring
an APA action to challenge the 1994 acquisition within the sixyear statute of limitations. Nor did the State timely challenge the
Rancheria’s federal recognition.
Affirmed.
D. July–August Cases
1. Idaho v. Coeur D’Alene Tribe
794 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 2015). State brought action to prevent
Indian tribe from offering poker at its casino. The district court, 49
F. Supp. 3d 751, denied tribe’s motion to dismiss and granted
state’s motion for preliminary injunction. Tribe appealed.
The appellate court held that: (1) tribe’s sovereign immunity
was abrogated by Indian Gaming Regulatory Act; (2) compact
between state and tribe did not require that dispute be submitted to
arbitration; and (3) preliminary injunction was warranted.
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VIII. JURISDICTION, FEDERAL
A. 2014 Cases
1. United States v. Webb
No. CR–10–01071–001, 2014 WL 4371276 (D. Ariz. Sept. 4,
2014). Before the Court was the Defendant’s Motion for
Termination of Garnishment. The court previously entered an
Amended Judgment against Defendant, ordering Defendant to
immediately pay $2,200 in restitution jointly and severally with
two other liable parties, and a special assessment of $100. Based
on Defendant’s ability to pay, the court imposed a payment
schedule consisting of quarterly payments of $25.00 over a period
of 96 months commencing 30 days after Defendant’s release from
prison.
While Defendant was incarcerated, the court imposed a
payment schedule through the Prisons’ Inmate Financial
Responsibility Program, through which Defendant would make
quarterly payments of at least $25.00. As of June 9, 2014,
Defendant remains liable for $2,225 under the Judgment.
Defendant is a member of the Gila River Indian Community, and
receives quarterly payments from the Gila River Indian
Community’s net gaming revenues.
The United States filed an Application for Writ of Garnishment
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 3205(c) to direct the payments received
from the Gila River Indian Community to Plaintiff. Defendant
requested a hearing and presented arguments opposing the Writ of
Garnishment. The court rejected Defendant’s arguments and
denied his hearing request in the Garnishment Disposition Order.
Defendant filed a Motion for Termination of Garnishment
arguing: (1) that the Judgment had priority over the Garnishment
Disposition Order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 3205(c)(8), and
therefore, payment on the restitution balance should not begin until
after his release from prison; and (2) that he should have only had
to pay one-third of the restitution because there were two
additional liable parties.
The court denied Defendant’s Motion for Termination of
Garnishment.
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2. Lewis v. White Mountain Apache Tribe
584 F. App’x 80 (9th Cir. 2014). Kay Lewis appealed the
district court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus
under 25 U.S.C. § 1303, the Indian Civil Rights Act. The district
court could not grant Lewis habeas relief unless he was in
“detention,” § 1303, or its functional equivalent, “custody,”
Jeffredo v. Macarro, 599 F.3d 913, 918 (9th Cir. 2010). Custody
involves “severe restraints on [a person’s] individual liberty,”
Hensley v. San Jose Dist. Mun. Ct., 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973),
including restraints that fall “outside conventional notions of
physical custody,” Edmunds v. Won Bae Chang, 509 F.2d 39, 40
(9th Cir. 1975).
The district court correctly held that the White Mountain
Apache Tribe’s refusal to permit Lewis to run for election to the
Tribal Council was not a sufficiently severe restraint on his liberty
to constitute custody. The restriction of Lewis’ candidacy does not
create a deprivation of liberty similar to the types of infringement
on personal movement previously recognized as establishing
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. See Hensley, 411 U.S. at 351
(release on own recognizance with restrictions on movement);
Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 237, 241–42 (1963) (parole
restrictions); Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85
F.3d 874, 879, 893–95 (2d Cir. 1996) (banishment).
The judgment of the district court was affirmed.
3. United States v. Bryant
769 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2014). In prosecution for domestic
assault within Indian country by habitual offender, the district
court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss indictment, and he
appealed.
The appellate court held that defendant’s prior uncounseled
tribal court domestic abuse convictions could not be used as
predicate offenses.
Reversed.
4. Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians v. N.Y. Dep't of Fin. Serv.
769 F.3d 105 (2nd Cir. 2014). Federally recognized Indian
tribes, limited liability companies owned by tribes, and tribes'
internal regulatory bodies brought action alleging that New York's

440

American Indian Law Journal

[Vol. 4:390

ban on high-interest, short-term consumer loans they offered over
internet violated Indian Commerce Clause. The district court, 974
F. Supp. 2d 353, denied plaintiffs' motion for preliminary
injunction, and they appealed.
The appellate court held that district court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate
likelihood of success on merits.
Affirmed.
5. Inetianbor v. Cashcall, Inc.
768 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2014). Borrower brought action
against loan servicer, alleging defamation, usury, and violation of
the Fair Credit Reporting Act. The district court, 962 F. Supp.
2d 1303, denied servicer’s motion to compel arbitration. Servicer
appealed.
The appellate court held that: (1) forum selection clause was
central and integral part of arbitration agreement; (2) arbitration by
Native American tribe was required by the agreement; and
(3) tribal forum was unavailable, precluding arbitration.
Affirmed.
6. Becker v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation
770 F.3d 944 (10th Cir. Oct. 21, 2014). In action alleging
breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, and accounting claims against Indian tribe, tribe moved to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court,
2013 WL 5954391, granted motion. Plaintiff appealed.
The appellate court held that federal courts lacked federal
question jurisdiction over state claims.
Affirmed.
7. In re McDonald
519 B.R. 324 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2014). Chapter 13 trustee
objected to exemption claimed by debtors in per capita payments
from Indian tribe, and also asserted that such payments had to be
considered in applying “best interests of creditors” test for
confirmation of plan.
The Bankruptcy Court held that: (1) per capita payments to
which Chapter 13 debtor was automatically entitled, regardless of
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need, as her share of gaming revenues earned by Indian tribe of
which she was member, were not excluded from property of estate
as beneficial interest in trust; (2) contingent interest that debtor had
in receiving these tribal payments was included in property of the
estate, and had to be considered in assessing whether proposed
Chapter 13 plan satisfied “best interests of creditors” test; (3) even
assuming that Tribal Code qualified as “local law,” it was not
“local law that [wa]s applicable on the [petition date] to the place
in which the debtor’s domicile [was] located”; and (4) per capita
payments made to debtor, without regard to need, as her share of
gaming revenues earned by Indian tribe, were not an exempt “local
public assistance benefit.”
Objections sustained.
8. Smith v. Parker
774 F.3d 1166 (8th Cir. 2014). Owners of businesses and clubs
that sold alcoholic beverages brought action against Omaha Tribal
Council members in their official capacities for prospective
injunctive and declaratory relief from tribe’s attempt to enforce its
liquor-license and tax scheme on owners. State of Nebraska and
United States intervened. Parties cross-moved for summary
judgment. The district court, 996 F. Supp. 2d 815, denied
plaintiffs’ motion and granted defendants’ motion. Plaintiffs
appealed.
The appellate court held that Omaha Reservation was not
diminished by 1882 Act ratifying agreement for sale of tribal lands
to non-Indian settlers.
Affirmed.
B. January–March Cases
1. Ducheneaux v. Ducheneaux
2015 SD 11, 861 N.W.2d 519. Before he died, the Decedent
transferred two quarter sections of Indian trust land located in
Tripp County, South Dakota, to his son. The Decedent’s estate (the
Estate) filed this action arguing that the Decedent lacked the
requisite mental capacity or was unduly influenced by his son
when he transferred the land. Specifically, the Estate requested that
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the court compel the Decedent’s son to make application to the
Secretary of the Interior for the transfer of the Indian trust property
to the Estate.
The circuit court denied the Estate’s request and dismissed the
action, determining that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
the parcels held in trust by the United States.
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did
not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case.
2. Washington v. Shale
345 P.3d 776 (Wash. 2015). Defendant was convicted in the
Superior Court, Jefferson County, of failure to register with the
county sheriff as a sex offender. Defendant appealed.
The Supreme Court of Washington held that state had
jurisdiction to prosecute defendant who was a member of an Indian
tribe living on another tribe’s lands. The Quinault Indian Nation
cooperated with the investigation, but chose not to prosecute Shale.
The Supreme Court chose to rely on U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Washington v. Colville Confederated Tribes (1980) to
uphold State jurisdiction over non-member Indians.
Affirmed.
C. April–June
1. United States v. Billie
611 F. App’x 608 (11th Cir. 2015). The United States filed a
petition to enforce an IRS administrative summons against Colley
Billie as Chairman of the General Council of the Miccosukee Tribe
of Indians of Florida. The district court entered an order enforcing
the summons, and Chairman Billie appealed, arguing enforcement
infringes upon the sovereign status of the tribe, required him to
release documents; tribal law prohibited him from releasing, and
required him to release documents he does not possess.
The appellate court concluded enforcement of the summons did
not implicate tribal sovereign immunity concerns and Chairman
Billie had not demonstrated a lack of possession. It also concluded
the issue regarding suspension of the examination was not properly
before the court.
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The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the district court.
2. NLRB v. Little River Band of Ottawa Indians Tribal Gov’t
788 F.3d 537 (6th Cir. 2015). The National Labor Relations
Board, 361 NLRB No. 45, 200 L.R.R.M. 2005, 2014 WL 4626007,
filed application for enforcement of order for Indian tribe to cease
and desist from enforcing provisions of ordinance regulating
employment and labor-organizing activities of its employees that
conflicted with National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
The appellate court held that: (1) Board’s determination that
NLRA’s definition of “employers” extended to Indian tribes was
not entitled to Chevron deference; and (2) NLRA applied to tribe’s
operation of casino.
Application granted.
3. Washington v. DePoe
188 Wash. App. 1012 (2015). A jury returned guilty verdicts in
Pierce County Superior Court against Dennis Darrel DePoe for
felony driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUI),
making a false or misleading statement to a public servant, first
degree driving with a suspended license, and operating a motor
vehicle without an ignition interlock device, all based on conduct
that occurred on land held in trust for the Puyallup Tribe of
Indians.
DePoe, an enrolled member of the federally recognized Sauk–
Suiattle Indian Tribe, appealed from the convictions entered on the
jury’s verdicts, arguing that: (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction
over the charged crimes, (2) the State presented insufficient
evidence to support a conviction on the DUI charge, (3) DePoe’s
attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, and (4) the
statute extending state jurisdiction over certain crimes in Indian
country and the DUI statute are unconstitutional as applied to
DePoe.
The appellate court affirmed, holding that the trial court had
jurisdiction over all the charged crimes and that DePoe’s
substantive arguments were not well founded.
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4. Howard ex rel. United States v. Shoshone-Paiute Tribes of the
Duck Valley Indian Reservation
608 F. App’x 468 (9th Cir. June 15, 2015) (mem.). Appellants
Thomas Howard and Robert Weldy (Relators) appealed from the
district court’s dismissal of their False Claims Act (FCA)
complaint against the Shoshone Paiute Tribes of the Duck Valley
Indian Reservation (Tribe).
The district court correctly concluded that the Tribe, like a
state, was a sovereign that did not fall within the definition of a
“person” under the FCA. Vermont Agency of Natural Res. v.
United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 778–87 (2000)
(applying the “longstanding interpretive presumption that ‘person’
does not include the sovereign,” to be “disregarded only upon
some affirmative showing of statutory intent to the contrary”). As
the district court explained, “the same historical evidence and
features of the FCA’s statutory scheme that failed to rebut the
presumption for the states in Stevens, here similarly fail[ed] to
rebut the presumption for sovereign Indian tribes.”
Therefore, Relators have failed to state a claim under the FCA,
and the action was properly dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in
denying Relators’ Rule 59 motion to alter or amend the judgment.
“A motion for reconsideration may not be used to raise arguments
or present evidence for the first time when they could reasonably
have been raised earlier in the litigation.” Marlyn Nutraceuticals,
Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir.
2009). In addition, the Tribe’s charter had been a public document
since 1936 and was not “newly discovered” evidence. See Coastal
Transfer Co. v. Toyota Motor Sales, 833 F.2d 208, 212 (9th Cir.
1987).
Affirmed.
5. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation v. Utah
790 F.3d 1000 (10th Cir. 2015). Indian tribe brought action
alleging that state and local governments were unlawfully trying to
displace tribal authority on tribal lands. State and counties filed
counterclaims alleging that tribe infringed their sovereignty. The
district court denied tribe’s motion for preliminary injunction to
halt tribal member’s prosecution for alleged traffic offenses on
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tribal land, tribe’s claim of immunity from counterclaims, and
county’s claim of immunity from tribe’s suit.
The appellate court held that: (1) county’s prosecution of tribal
member constituted irreparable injury to tribal sovereignty;
(2) Anti–Injunction Act did not bar federal court from issuing
preliminary injunction; (3) Younger abstention was not warranted;
(4) mutual assistance agreement between state and tribe did not
waive tribe’s sovereign immunity from suit in state court;
(5) doctrine of equitable recoupment did not apply to permit state
and county to assert counterclaims; and (6) county attorneys were
not entitled to sovereign immunity.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
D. July–August Cases
1. Soaring Eagle Casino and Resort v. NLRB
791 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2015). Casino operated by Indian tribe
on reservation land petitioned for review of National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) order, 2014 WL 5426873, finding that
casino’s no-solicitation policy was unfair labor practice and
ordering casino to cease and desist from maintaining nosolicitation rule and to reinstate employee discharged for violating
that rule through union solicitation to her former position with
back pay and benefits. NLRB cross-applied for enforcement of its
order.
The appellate court held that: (1) neither 1855 and 1864 treaties
nor federal Indian law and policies prevented application of the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) to tribal-owned casino
operated on trust land within a reservation, and (2) casino fell
within scope of the NLRA, and NLRB had jurisdiction to regulate
casino’s employment practices.
Petition denied and cross-application granted.
2. United States v. Bryant
792 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2015) (mem.). The conflict that
presents itself again and again in this case was how to apply
Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 128 L. Ed.
2d 745 (1994), to cases like Bryant, where the government seeks to
use uncounseled tribal court misdemeanor convictions as an
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essential element of a felony prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 117(a).
The dissents from denial of rehearing en banc, along with two
other circuits, urge a bright-line reading of Nichols that permits the
use of these convictions as long as they do not violate the Sixth
Amendment (which tribal court convictions, by definition, never
do). The court wrote to explain why Bryant did not apply this
bright-line rule, while recognizing that only the Supreme Court can
clarify the meaning and scope of its decision in Nichols.
3. United States v. Zepeda
792 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2015). Defendant was convicted in the
district court of conspiracy to commit assault with dangerous
weapon and to commit assault resulting in serious bodily injury,
assault resulting in serious bodily injury, assault with dangerous
weapon, and use of firearm during crime of violence. Defendant
appealed. The appellate court, 738 F.3d 201, reversed and
remanded, but subsequently granted rehearing en banc.
On rehearing en banc, the appellate court held that: (1) under
the Indian Major Crimes Act (IMCA), government had to prove
only that the defendant has some quantum of Indian blood,
whether or not traceable to a federally recognized tribe, overruling
United States v. Maggi, 598 F.3d 1073; (2) a defendant must have
been an Indian at the time of the charged conduct under ICMA;
(3) a tribe’s federally recognized status was a question of law to be
determined by the trial judge; (4) evidence at trial was sufficient to
support the finding that defendant was an Indian within the
meaning of the IMCA at the time of his crimes; and
(5) Defendant’s prison term of 90 years and three months was
reasonable.
4. California v. Riley
189 Cal. Rptr. 3d 870 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015). Defendants were
convicted in the superior court of three counts of commercial
bribery arising out of insurance premiums charged to Native
American casino. Defendants appealed.
The appellate court held that: (1) defendant who had left casino
job and had become chief financial officer for tribal government
was not an employee of casino, as specified in indictment, at time
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of two alleged acts of commercial bribery; (2) evidence was
sufficient to support conviction even if no specific gratuity could
be tied to any specific instance of overcharging; and (3) evidence
was sufficient to support finding that defendants acted with the
specific intent to harm casino.
IX. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
A. 2014 Cases
1. Thorpe v. Borough of Thorpe
770 F.3d 255 (3rd Cir. 2014). Native American brought action
under § 1983 and Native American Graves Protection and
Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) to require borough to return his
father’s remains to tribe. The district court dismissed plaintiff’s
§ 1983 claim, 2011 WL 5878377, and entered summary judgment
in plaintiff’s favor on NAGPRA claim, 2013 WL 1703572.
Borough appealed.
The appellate court held that borough was not “museum” under
NAGPRA.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
B. January–March Cases
1. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation v. U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Serv.
No. 1:14–CV–3052, 2015 WL 1276811 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 20,
2015). Plaintiff, Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama
Nation (“Yakama Nation”), and Intervenor–Plaintiff, Confederated
Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Reservation (“Umatilla Tribes”),
sought judicial review of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
(“Service”) decision approving public wildflower tours within the
Lalíik Traditional Cultural Property (TCP).
Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that (1) the Service violated the
consultation provisions of the National Historic Preservation Act
(NHPA), and (2) the Service’s “no adverse effect” finding was
arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA).
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Lalíik, also known as Rattlesnake Mountain, sits within the
Hanford Reach National Monument (HRNM) in Benton County,
Washington. Associated with practices and beliefs of the Washani,
Lalíik is a sacred mountain with traditional cultural and religious
significance to the local Hanford area tribes: Yakama Nation,
Umatilla Tribes, Nez Perce, and Wanapum Band. Lalíik is located
within lands ceded to the United States under the Treaty of 1855
and has maintained varying land use designations throughout the
past several decades.
In 2007, the U.S. Department of Energy designated Lalíik a
Traditional Cultural Property (TCP) pursuant to the National
Historic Preservation Act, making the area eligible for listing on
the National Register of Historic Places. The designation relied
upon the status of Lalíik as a “spiritual location of primary
importance to groups of American Indians within the region.”
In 2010 and again in 2011 the Service consulted with the
Hanford area tribes about organizing limited public access tours of
Laliik TCP. In both instances, the tribes voiced their opposition
and the tours were abandoned.
In February 2012, the Service proposed a third undertaking in a
meeting with the Tribes and via e-mail the Service proposed public
wildflower tours within the Lalíik TCP and invited the Tribes’
review. Yakama Nation voiced its opposition to the undertaking,
stating that “the nature of [Lalíik’s ] cultural significance is not
conducive to tourism and recreation and will adversely affect the
TCP.” Similarly, Umatilla Tribes opposed the proposal due to the
potential adverse effect the tour would have on the Lalíik TCP.
The Service indicating that it “w [ould] go no adverse effect.”
The court granted in part Umatilla Tribes’ Motion for
Summary Judgment and Yakama Nation’s Cross–Motion for
Summary Judgment on the Record. The Service’s Section 106
finding of “no adverse effect” was set aside as arbitrary and
capricious or otherwise without observance of procedures required
by law and this matter was remanded to the Agency.
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C. April–June Cases
1. Schlemm v. Wall
784 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 2015). Prisoner, a Navajo Tribe
member, brought action under Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) against Wisconsin
Department of Corrections, seeking an order requiring the state
prison system to accommodate some of his religious practices. The
district court, 2014 WL 2591879, granted prison's summary
judgment motion. Prisoner appealed.
The appellate court held that: (1) genuine issues of material
fact existed as to whether prisoner's inability to eat game meat for
a religious feast substantially burdened his religious exercise,
precluding summary judgment on prisoner's RLUIPA claim, and
(2) genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether prisoner's
inability to wear a multicolored headband while praying in his cell
and during group religious ceremonies substantially burdened his
religious exercise, precluding summary judgment on prisoner's
RLUIPA claim.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
X. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
A. 2014 Cases
1. Johnson v. Wyandotte Tribe of Okla.
No. 14–2117, 2014 WL 5025901 (D. Kan. Oct. 8, 2014).
Plaintiff brought this personal injury action against the Wyandotte
Nation for injuries she sustained when she fell down a flight of
stairs at the 7th Street Casino, which was located on land held in
trust by the United States for the benefit of the Wyandotte Nation.
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss was before the court.
Defendant argued that the court must dismiss plaintiff's lawsuit
because defendant, a federally recognized Indian tribe, was
immune from unconsented suit and, therefore, the court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1).
Plaintiff visited the 7th Street Casino to play electronic gaming
machines. As plaintiff was leaving the casino, her heel became
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lodged in a strip of carpet causing her to fall headlong down a
flight of stairs. As a result of the fall, plaintiff sustained injuries to
her head and foot and experienced an onset of pain. Thereafter,
plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the Wyandotte Tribe of Oklahoma
in the District court of Wyandotte County, Kansas, asserting a
single claim of negligence under Kansas law.
Defendant timely filed a Notice of Removal asserting federal
question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, thereby removing the
case from state court to the federal court. Absent an unequivocal
waiver by the Wyandotte Nation or any contrary legislative intent,
the court concluded that the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred
plaintiff's suit.
Therefore, the court granted the Wyandotte Nation's motion
and dismissed the lawsuit.
2. Sue/perior Concrete & Paving, Inc,. v. Lewiston Golf Course
Corp.
25 N.E.3d 928 (N.Y. 2014). Concrete and paving contractor
brought action against, inter alia, corporation that was formed
under laws of Seneca Nation of Indians, asserting causes of action
for foreclosure of mechanic's lien, breach of contract, breach of
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, quantum meruit,
promissory estoppel, and fraud, in relation to contract to build golf
course with associated driving range, club house, and pro shop.
The supreme court, denied corporation's motion to dismiss on
sovereign immunity grounds. Corporation appealed.
The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 109 A.D. 3d 80, 968
N.Y.S. 2d 271, determined that corporation was not arm of tribe,
and thus was not entitled to share tribe's immunity from suit.
Corporation was granted leave to appeal, and question was
certified.
The Court of Appeals of New York held that corporation was
not entitled to tribal sovereign immunity.
Affirmed.
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B. January–March Cases
1. Comenout v. Whitener
No. C15–5054, 2015 WL 917631 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 3, 2015).
Comenout sought injunctive relief preventing Whitener from
removing Comenout’s business property and from taking over
Comenout’s business. Comenout resided on a parcel of land
located in Puyallup, Washington. The United States held the land
in trust for the thirteen owners of the allotment, one of whom was
Comenout. Comenout had operated a convenience store on the
property for many years.
On November 1, 2014, some of the landowners entered into a
business lease for the property with the Quinault Indian Nation
(Nation). Pursuant to the lease, the owners were the lessors and the
Nation the lessee. Comenout did not consent to the lease. Under
the terms of the lease, the Nation “shall use the Premises for the
following specific purposes: retail sales of cigarettes and retail
sales of other convenience store products, but specifically
excluding the sale of marijuana and the sale of fireworks.”
On November 20, 2014, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
approved the lease, thereby making it legally effective. On
December 23, 2014, Comenout appealed the lease to the Regional
Director of the BIA. On January 9, 2015, Whitener posted a sign
on the property, directing Comenout to remove his personal and
commercial property from the allotment.
Whitener moved to dismiss Comenout’s suit under
FRCP 12(b)(7) for failure to join the Nation as an indispensable
party. Whitener contended that Comenout’s claims implicated the
interests of the Nation, but the Nation could not be joined because
of its sovereign immunity.
The Court found that the Nation was a necessary party under
Rule 19(a). Because the Nation had not waived its sovereign
immunity to be sued by Comenout in federal court, the court
concludes that the Nation could not be joined in the action. The
court found that the Nation was an indispensable party under Rule
19(b). A judgment in Comenout’s favor would prejudice the
Nation’s contractual rights under the lease. Comenout also could
not be accorded complete relief in the Nation’s absence because
any injunction would not be binding on the Nation. Further, the
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relief sought by Comenout could not be shaped to lessen the
potential prejudice to either Comenout or the Nation. Partial relief
was also inadequate, because the Nation could still attempt to
enforce its rights to use the property for commercial purposes as
the lessee.
The court concluded that the Nation was an indispensable party
and granted Whitener’s motion to dismiss.
2. Allen v. Smith
No. 13–55552, 2015 WL 1138391 (9th Cir. Mar. 16, 2015).
Ronald D. Allen and twenty-six other former members of the Pala
Band of Mission Indians (Appellants) appealed the district court’s
order dismissing the case for want for subject matter jurisdiction.
Appellants did not challenge the Pala Band of Mission Indians’
(Tribe’s) disenrollment decision directly, but instead filed suit
against present and former members of the Tribe’s Executive
Committee (Appellees) in their individual capacities, asserting
violations of various federal statutes and common law principles.
Appellants’ prayer for relief included (1) “a declaratory
judgment that the [Appellees’] improper disenrollment of
[Appellants] constituted violations of their civil rights”; (2) “a
permanent injunction to invalidate [Appellees’] wrongful
disenrollment actions”; (3) “an order declaring the wrongful
disenrollment of [Appellants] by [Appellees] to be null and void;”
(4) “an order requiring [Appellees] to pay back the money and lost
benefits that were withheld and/or taken away from [Appellants]
while they were wrongfully disenrolled”; (5) “an order for
compensatory damages against the [Appellees] for violations of
[Appellants’] rights in the amount appropriate to the proof adduced
at trial”; and (6) “an order for punitive damages against
[Appellees] for causing, approving and/or ratifying the
disenrollment of the [Appellants], and for consequential loss of
money, property, and heritage.”
This relief sought by the Appellants clearly operated against
the Tribe. The requested relief would prevent the Tribe from
disenrolling the Appellants and compel it to reinstate their
membership and tribal benefits. Even the request for compensatory
and punitive damages (to be paid by the Appellees, not the Tribe)
would interfere with the Tribe’s public administration, because the
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monetary damages are predicated on this court’s determination that
the disenrollment of the Appellants was improper.
Thus, the court concluded that Appellants’ suit should be
construed as a suit against the Tribe itself. Appellants concede that
the Tribe is protected from suit by its sovereign immunity. The
Tribe’s sovereign immunity also protects the named Appellees,
because they were acting in their official capacity when they
disenrolled the Appellants.
On appeal, Appellants argued a violation of federal law only on
the basis that Appellees were collaterally estopped from making a
membership decision that runs contrary to the Department of
Interior’s 1989 administrative decision. Even assuming that the
preclusive effect of an agency decision qualifies as federal law
under Ex parte Young, Appellants’ briefing did not demonstrate
why the 1989 decision had preclusive effect against the Appellees.
Even if the court allowed Appellants to drop the request for
injunctive relief from their Complaint, the pleading would still
require a federal court to evaluate whether the Tribe’s
disenrollment was proper. Thus, “it is clear, upon de novo review,
that the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.”
Affirmed.
C. April–June Cases
1. North Quinault Properties, LLC v. Quinault Indian Nation
No. 3:14-cv-06025-RBL (W.D. Wash. May 4, 2015). Plaintiffs
alleged in its Complaint that Lake Quinault, a navigable waterway
abutting the Quinault Indian Reservation and located in
Washington State, should have been open to the public for its use
and recreation as well as to those non-tribal property owners with
real property abutting the Lake shore such as the Plaintiffs.
However for more than a decade the Quinault Indian Tribe had
asserted jurisdiction and control over this navigable waterway.
Most recently, the Quinault Indian Tribe had restricted all use of
the Lake for non-tribal members.
Through this civil action, the Plaintiffs sought court
determination as to the status of Lake Quinault and the property
rights of non-tribal property owners abutting the Lake and court
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determination as to the public’s right to access of the Lake, its
shore and lakebed.”
Defendants Quinault Indian Tribe, State of Washington, and
the Department of Natural Resources (State Defendants) filed
Motions to Dismiss.
The court found that the Complaint against the Quinault Indian
Nation is barred by the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity and
granted the Motion to Dismiss.
As to the State Defendants, the court found that Plaintiffs failed
to state a claim upon which the court could grant relief because
State Defendants were immune from suit under the Eleventh
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
The Complaint was dismissed without prejudice with leave to
amend.
2. Blue Lake Rancheria v. Lanier
106 F. Supp. 3d 1134 (E.D. Cal. 2015). Blue Lake Rancheria
(Plaintiff) alleged that the California Employment Development
Department (EDD) violated its tribal sovereign immunity by
attaching liens on tribal assets. Plaintiff moved for summary
judgment. Plaintiff is a federally recognized tribe.
For several years, a division of the Tribe’s federally-chartered
corporation called Mainstay Business Solutions (Mainstay)
operated a “temporary staffing and employee leasing business.” In
2003, Mainstay elected to participate in a joint federal-state
unemployment insurance program. Mainstay became a
“reimbursable employer.” As such, the state would pay former
employees and Mainstay would later reimburse the state for those
costs.
In 2008, a dispute arose as to the amount Mainstay owed in
reimbursement. When the parties were unable to resolve their
dispute, EDD attached liens to the Tribe’s property under
California Government Code § 7171 in several counties. EDD also
issued subpoenas to Plaintiff’s banks seeking information about the
Tribe’s assets.
The Tribe filed suit against officers of EDD seeking to enjoin
their collection actions and cancel the liens, and for a declaratory
judgment that Defendants’ actions violated Plaintiff’s sovereign
immunity.
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The Tribe brought a motion for summary judgment to dispose
of all its claims. Defendants opposed the motion and, in the
alternative, requested that the Court defer adjudication until later in
discovery, which is set to close in November.
The Court denied Defendants’ request to defer adjudication and
granted Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.
3. Cosentino v. Fuller
189 Cal. Rptr. 3d 15 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015). Former table games
dealer at Indian tribal casino brought action against five members
of the tribe’s gaming commission for intentional and negligent
interference with prospective economic advantage, intentional
interference with the right to pursue a lawful occupation, a civil
rights violation under state law, and intentional and negligent
infliction of emotional distress, alleging the members revoked his
gaming license in retaliation for his work as confidential informant
for the California Department of Justice.
The superior court granted members’ motion to quash service
of summons and dismiss the complaint. Dealer appealed.
The appellate court held that: (1) tribal sovereign immunity did
not support members’ motion to quash service of process, and
(2) members could not raise affirmative defense by motion to
quash service of process.
Reversed.
4. In re Greektown Holdings, LLC
532 B.R. 680 (E.D. Mich. 2015). This matter was before the
Court on Appellants Sault St. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians
and Kewadin Casinos Gaming Authority’s (Appellants or
collectively “the Tribe”) appeal of United States Bankruptcy Judge
Walter J. Shapero’s August 13, 2014 Opinion and Order denying
Appellants’ motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity. The
Tribe challenged the Bankruptcy Court’s ruling in the underlying
Adversary Proceeding that Congress intended to abrogate tribal
sovereign immunity from suit in section 106(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code when it abrogated the sovereign immunity of “governmental
unit[s],” and further defined a “governmental unit” in § 101(27) of
the Bankruptcy Code to include “other . . . domestic
government[s].”
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The Tribe appealed the Bankruptcy Court’s Order denying its
motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity, arguing that the
failure of the Legislature to clearly and unequivocally manifest an
intent to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity when describing the
entities whose sovereign immunity was abrogated under the
Bankruptcy Code required dismissal of the claims against it in the
Bankruptcy Court Adversary Proceeding.
The Litigation Trustee responded that the Legislature need not
invoke the magic words “Indian tribes” when intending to remove
the cloak of sovereign immunity that otherwise shields Indian
tribes from suits against them and argued that the Legislature
clearly and equivocally intended just that when it included the
catchall phrase “or other . . . domestic government” in § 101(27) of
the Bankruptcy Code when defining the term “governmental unit.”
The court reversed the decision of the Bankruptcy Court, found
that Congress did not clearly and unequivocally express an intent
to abrogate the sovereign immunity of Indian tribes in § 106(a) of
the Bankruptcy Code, and remanded the matter to the Bankruptcy
Court for further proceedings on the issue of whether the Tribe
waived its sovereign immunity from suit in the underlying
bankruptcy proceedings.
5. Pistor v. Garcia
791 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2015). “Advantage gamblers” brought
§ 1983 action against tribal police chief, tribal gaming office
inspector, and general manager of casino, which was owned and
operated by tribe on tribal land, for detaining gamblers and seizing
their property in violation of gamblers’ Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. The district court, 2012 WL 3848453, denied
defendants’ motion to dismiss. Gamblers appealed.
The appellate court held that tribal police chief, tribal gaming
office inspector, and general manager of casino were not entitled to
invoke the tribe’s sovereign immunity from liability in their
individual capacities.
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D. July–August Cases
1. South Fork Livestock Partnership v. United States
No. 3:15–CV–0066, 2015 WL 4232687 (D. Nev. Jul. 13,
2015). Before the court were defendants’, the Te–Moak Tribe of
Western Shoshone Indians of Nevada (Tribe), the South Fork Band
(South Fork), Davis Gonzalez, Alice Tybo, and Virgil Townsend’s
(collectively “tribal defendants”), motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. This was a civil rights action involving
the use of federal grazing permits on federal land. Plaintiff SF
Livestock was a partnership made up of several tribal members
who were granted federal grazing permits for various areas located
in the State of Nevada. SF Livestock alleged that tribal defendants
prevented it from exercising its rights under the federal grazing
permits by restricting their access to the land designated in the
federal grazing permits.
In its complaint, SF Livestock alleged four causes of action
including: (1) civil rights violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971);
(2) property rights violations; (3) access to water violations; and
(4) injunctive and monetary relief. In response, tribal defendants
filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Tribal defendants argued that they should be dismissed as
defendants because neither defendant Te–Moak Tribe nor
defendant South Fork had waived their sovereign immunity from
suit.
The court noted that there was no congressional act authorizing
a suit against a tribe for alleged violations of federal grazing
permits. Further, the court found that there was no express waiver
of sovereign immunity by either defendant Te–Moak Tribe or
defendant South Fork for the present action. In general, the
umbrella of tribal sovereign immunity from suit also extended to
tribal officials.
The court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss; dismissed as
defendants Te–Moak Tribe of Western Shoshone Indians of
Nevada and the South Fork Band; and dismissed without prejudice
defendants Davis Gonzalez, Alice Tybo, and Virgil Townsend.
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XI. SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL INHERENT
A. 2014 Cases
1. New Mexico v. Sanchez
2014-NMCA-095, 335 P.3d 253 (N.M. Ct. App. 2014).
Defendant, a non-Indian, was convicted in a bench trial in the
Magistrate Court, Santa Fe County, of aggravated driving while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs (DWI)
following his arrest on tribal property by a tribal police officer who
was cross-commissioned as a county special deputy sheriff.
Defendant appealed. The district court again convicted him of
DWI. Defendant appealed.
The appellate court held that: (1) as a matter of first
impression, tribal officer was properly cross-commissioned as a
special deputy; (2) as a matter of first impression, officer was
authorized to investigate and arrest defendant for DWI; (3) officer
was authorized to carry a concealed weapon; and (4) officer’s
increased pay as part of grant program with Bureau of Indian
Affairs concerning dedicated DWI officers did not provide
defendant with a statutory defense concerning an officer’s receipt
of prohibited compensation.
Affirmed.
2. Koniag, Inc. v. Andrew Airways, Inc.
No. 3:13–cv–00051, 2014 WL 4926344 (D. Alaska Sept. 30,
2014). Defendant Alicia L. Reft (Reft) filed a Motion and
Memorandum to Dismiss Complaint against Alicia Reft in her
Capacity as President of Karluk Tribal Council and Individual
Capacity. The relevant facts for purposes of the motion to dismiss,
as alleged in Koniag's Complaint, are as follows.: Koniag is an
Alaska Native Regional Corporation established pursuant to
Section 7 of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971.
Koniag merged with the Karluk Native Corporation in 1980
(Merger), pursuant to 43 U.S.C. § 1627. As a result of the Merger,
Koniag now owns the land that had previously been patented to the
Karluk Native Corporation.
Koniag's Complaint alleged that Andrew Airways Inc. and its
principal owner and operator, Dean T. Andrew (together, the
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“Andrew Defendants”), at the direction and license, lease,
authorization, or permission of Reft, built a cabin known as Mary's
Creek Cabin (the “Cabin”) on Koniag's land without Koniag's
authorization or consent. Koniag's Complaint also alleged, upon
information and belief, that the Andrew Defendants operated the
Cabin as a rental property.
The parties in this case, or parties related to them, have been
involved in other actions in the recent past, including a lawsuit in
the Karluk Tribal Court filed in 2012 by the Native Village of
Karluk against Koniag concerning, among other things, the Merger
and the rights to the land Koniag owns as a result of the Merger. In
an action filed in this Court by Koniag, also in 2012, the court held
that the Karluk Tribal Court had no basis for exercising jurisdiction
over Koniag in that tribal court action. Koniag brought the present
action for intentional trespass, ejectment, and to quiet title in
connection with the Cabin. The federal law implications that may
arise in this hypothetical cause of action were too attenuated to
find federal question jurisdiction here based on a complete
preemption theory.
For the foregoing reasons, it was ordered that Defendant Alicia
Reft's Motion to Dismiss at Docket 36 was granted.
B. April–June Cases
1. Belcourt Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Davis
786 F.3d 653 (8th Cir. 2015). School district and its employees
brought action seeking a declaration that Indian tribal court lacked
jurisdiction over tribe members’ claims against district and
employees for defamation, excessive use of force, and various
employment related-claims. District moved for default judgment
against one tribe member. The district court, 997 F. Supp. 2d 1017,
denied motion and held that tribal court had jurisdiction. District
and employees appealed.
The appellate court held that: (1) even if district could agree to
expand tribal court jurisdiction under North Dakota law, agreement
between district and tribe was not a “consensual relationship”
within meaning of exception to general rule that a tribe may not
regulate activities of nonmembers, and thus tribal court lacked
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jurisdiction over tribe members’ action; (2) tribe members’ claims
did not involve conduct that threatened or directly affected the
political integrity, economic safety, or health or welfare of the
tribe, and thus tribal court lacked jurisdiction over claims; and
(3) district court did not abuse its discretion in denying school
district’s motion for default judgment.
2. Fort Yates Pub. Sch. Dist. # 4 v. Murphy ex rel. C.M.B.
786 F.3d 662 (8th Cir. 2015). After parent of student who was
a tribe member filed tribal-court complaint alleging tort claims
against nonmember public school district, school district filed
federal-court complaint seeking declaration that tribal court lacked
jurisdiction. The district court, 997 F. Supp. 2d 1009, granted
parent’s motion to dismiss. School district appealed.
The appellate court held that: (1) agreement between tribe and
school district was not a “consensual relationship” that conferred
jurisdiction on tribal court over parent’s suit; (2) parent’s suit did
not involve conduct that threatened or had some direct effect on
political integrity, economic security, or health or welfare of the
tribe, as would have given tribal court jurisdiction; (3) sovereign
immunity barred school district’s suit against tribal court; and
(4) school district was not required to exhaust its tribal remedies
before commencing suit.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
C. July–August Cases
1. Sprint Communications Co. L.P. v. Wynne
121 F. Supp. 3d 893 (D.S.D. 2015). A motion for preliminary
injunction filed by Sprint Communications Company, L.P., and
Sprint Communications, Inc. (collectively, Sprint) was before the
court. Defendants opposed the motion. Sprint Communications,
Inc. (Sprint Inc.) was the parent company of Sprint
Communications Company (Sprint Communications). The Oglala
Sioux Tribal Utilities Commission (OSTUC) was formally
established in 2013 as a subdivision of the Oglala Sioux Tribe. The
OSTUC was responsible for the exercise of tribal regulatory
authority over all utility systems on the Pine Ridge Indian
Reservation.

2016]

Case Law on American Indians: 2014–2015

461

As an interexchange carrier (IXC), Sprint Communications
delivered long-distance calls from one local area to another. When
an individual made a long-distance telephone call, the call
originated with the local exchange carrier (LEC) serving the
individual making the call and was transported by the IXC selected
by the calling individual to the LEC serving the individual
receiving the call. IXCs paid "originating" and "terminating"
access charges to the LECs that served individuals who initiated
and received long-distance calls, respectively.
In 2014, the OSTUC initiated seven rulemaking proceedings
involving utility providers on Pine Ridge and adopted 12 orders. In
one of those orders, U-1-2014, the OSTUC created: a registration
requirement for all utilities. Sprint did not participate in the
development or implementation of U-1-2014. Sprint
Communications had not registered with or obtained a business
license from the OSTUC. Several telecommunications companies,
including Sprint Communications, had refused to comply with the
requirements imposed by the OSTUC.
As a result of that noncompliance, the OSTUC filed a
complaint against those carriers, including Sprint. Subsequently,
Sprint filed its complaint in this matter. Sprint argued that the tribal
regulatory process is a disguised effort to compel IXCs to pay
Native American Telecom-Pine Ridge (NAT-PR), a tribal LEC, for
terminating access charges associated with an access stimulation
run on Pine Ridge.
Sprint sought a declaratory judgment that neither Sprint Inc.
nor Sprint Communications was subject to regulation by the
OSTUC, and an order permanently enjoining the OSTUC from
proceeding against Sprint. Sprint requested a preliminary
injunction. In support, Sprint asserted that it did not have to
exhaust its tribal court remedies because it was plain that the tribal
court did not have jurisdiction over either Sprint entity. As the
FCC had recognized, tribes have a role to play in the regulation of
telecommunications services.
This court respected the tribal court's prerogative to settle
questions of its jurisdiction and to explain the basis for its
acceptance or rejection thereof. Sprint had not demonstrated that
tribal jurisdiction in this matter violated an express jurisdictional
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prohibition or that tribal jurisdiction plainly did not exist and
would only serve to delay these proceedings. Because exhaustion
of tribal remedies was required as a matter of comity, the court
denied Sprint's motion for a preliminary injunction. In doing so,
the court did not hold that tribal jurisdiction over Sprint was
ultimately proper under Montana, only that the tribal court should
have been given the first opportunity to resolve that question.
Under these facts, it was proper to stay this action pending Sprint's
exhaustion of its tribal remedies.
Accordingly, it was ordered that Sprint's motion to supplement
the record be granted.
It was further ordered that Sprint's motion for a preliminary
injunction was denied.
It is further ordered that this action be stayed until further order
of the court.
2. Harvey v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation
797 F.3d 800 (10th Cir. 2015). In April 2013, plaintiffs filed a
complaint in Utah state court seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief as to the authority of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and
Ouray Reservation (the “Tribe”) over non-Indian businesses
operating on certain categories of land. It also alleged that Dino
Cesspooch, Jackie LaRose, and Sheila Wopsock, individuals
affiliated with the Ute Tribal Employment Rights Office, had
harassed and extorted plaintiffs in violation of state law.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss in state court, that the
state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in the absence of a
valid waiver of tribal sovereign immunity, that the Tribe and its
officers were immune from suit but were necessary and
indispensable parties, and that plaintiffs failed to exhaust
administrative remedies in tribal court.
The Tribe filed a notice of removal in the U.S. District court
for the District of Utah on September 20, 2013. Plaintiffs filed a
motion to remand, arguing that the initial defendants waived their
right to removal—or to consent to removal—by litigating in state
court, that removal was untimely, that the defendants had not
unanimously consented to removal, and that the federal court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
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The district court granted the motion to remand. It concluded
that because the initial defendants' conduct manifested an intent to
litigate in state court, they waived their right to removal and their
right to consent to removal.
On appeal, the court held that the district court order
remanding because of lack of unanimity is not reviewable under 28
U.S.C.S. § 1447(d). The order specifically stated that the
unanimity requirement could not be met because some defendants
waived their right to consent to removal.
Because § 1447(d) precluded review of the remand order
issued by the district court, the appeal was dismissed.
XII. TAX
A. 2014 Cases
1. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida
49 F. Supp. 3d 1095 (S.D. Fla. 2014). Before the court were
Cross Motions for Summary Judgment. The Seminole Tribe of
Florida filed this lawsuit challenging the imposition of two Florida
taxes: the Rental Tax and the Utility Tax. The Seminole Tribe of
Florida was a federally recognized Indian tribe, with reservations
throughout Florida. The Florida Department of Revenue was the
agency responsible for collecting tax revenues and enforcing
Florida’s tax laws. Marshall Stranburg was the executive director
of the Department of Revenue.
The Seminole Tribe owns and operates entertainment and
gaming facilities, including the Seminole Hard Rock Hotel and
Casinos, at its Hollywood Reservation and its Tampa Reservation.
As part of these operations, the Tribe leased a portion of the space
at the Seminole Hollywood Casino to Ark Hollywood, LLC, and a
portion of the space at the Seminole Tampa Casino to Ark Tampa,
LLC. Florida assessed a tax on the rent paid to the Seminole Tribe
by Ark Hollywood and Ark Tampa for the leases on the Tribe’s
Reservations.
The Seminole Tribe asserted that Federal law prohibited the
Rental Tax. Florida also imposed a Utility Tax on electricity that
was delivered to the Seminole Tribe on tribal reservations. The
Tribe argued that Federal law prohibited Florida from imposing
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this tax. Previously, the court determined that the State of Florida
was immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, but that
Stranburg, as executive director of the Florida Department of
Revenue, was a proper defendant in this lawsuit.
The court found that federal law prohibited Florida from
collecting the Rental Tax from the Ark entities for their leases of
reservation land. The court further found that federal law
preempted the application of the Rental Tax to the Tribe’s leases
with the Ark entities. The court also found that federal law
prohibited Florida from collecting the Utility Tax from the Tribe
since the legal incidence of the Utility Tax falls on the Seminole
Tribe.
The court granted the Seminole Tribe’s Motion for Summary
Judgment and denied Stranburg’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
2. King Mountain Tobacco Co., Inc. v. McKenna
768 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2014). Tobacco and cigarette
manufacturing company owned by Yakama tribal member, and
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Indian Nation
brought action against Washington’s Attorney General, for
declaratory and injunctive relief from Washington’s escrow statute.
The district court, 2013 WL 1403342, granted summary judgment
in favor of state. Plaintiffs appealed.
The appellate court held that: (1) escrow statute was a
nondiscriminatory law; (2) district court properly determined
whether manufacturer’s products were principally generated from
reservation land; and (3) Yakama Treaty was not an express
federal law that exempted manufacturer from Washington’s
escrow statute.
Affirmed.
B. July–August Cases
1. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Stranburg
799 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2015). Tribe filed suit against the
State of Florida and the director of the Florida Department of
Revenue seeking injunctive relief against state Rental Tax and
Utility Tax imposed on two non-Indian corporations with 25-year
leases to provide food-court operations at two tribal casinos. The
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district court summary judgment in favor of the Tribe and the State
appealed.
The Court of Appeals affirmed as to the Rental Tax, holding
that 25 U.S.C. 465 barred the tax in light of Mescalero Apache
Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973). The court also affirmed on an
issue of first impression—the effect of BIA regulations providing
that “activities under a lease conducted on leased premises” were
not subject to state taxation. 25 C.F.R. 162.017(c).
While the court did not defer to the Secretary’s determination
of federal preemption, it agreed that the Rental Tax was preempted
by federal law under Bracker. However, the court rejected the
district court’s determination that the incidence of the Utility Tax
fell on the Tribe and ruled that the Tribe had not established that
the Utility Tax was generally preempted as a matter of law.
2. Auto United Trades Org. v. Washington
357 P.3d 615 (Wash. 2015). Trade association of Washington
gasoline and automotive service retailers brought action against the
State alleging that fuel tax compacts entered into with various
Indian tribes which provided for refunds of gas tax paid were
unconstitutional. The Superior Court, Grays Harbor County,
dismissed for non-joinder of parties. Trade association appealed.
The Supreme Court of Washington reversed and held that
while Indian tribes were necessary parties, they were not
indispensable so as to warrant dismissal. 175 Wash.2d 214, 285
P.3d 52 (2012).
On remand, the court dismissed on the merits and trade
association appealed again.
The Supreme Court, Justice Gonzales for a unanimous court,
affirmed. Art. II, Sec. 40 of the Constitution expressly allowing for
refunds authorized by law for taxes paid on motor vehicle fuels.
The then-applicable statutes (since repealed) authorized compacts
that provide for refunds.
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XIII. TRUST BREACH AND CLAIMS
A. 2014 Cases
1. Schaghticoke Indian Tribe v. Kent Sch. Corp. Inc.
595 F. App’x 32 (2d Cir. 2014). These appeals arose from three
consolidated actions. The common claim made by the
Schaghticoke Tribal Nation (STN) in each case was that it was an
Indian tribe that had been dispossessed of Indian land without the
approval of Congress in violation of the Indian Nonintercourse
Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177. That statute provided, in relevant part, that
“[n]o purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of
any title or claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of
Indians, shall be of any validity in law or equity, unless the same
be made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the
Constitution.”
The consolidated cases were stayed in 1999 to allow STN to
complete the Department of the Interior's (DOI) federal
acknowledgment process – a formal regulatory process by which
DOI would decide whether a petitioning group was entitled to
certain privileges and benefits provided to officially recognized
tribes. See 25 C.F.R. § 83.2.
In 2005, DOI concluded that STN did not meet all of the
criteria for federal acknowledgement and its determination was
upheld on appeal. Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v. Kempthorne, 587
F.3d 132, 134 (2d Cir. 2009). Following that determination, the
Defendants–Appellees moved for judgment on the pleadings in
district court, which the court granted. STN appealed from the
district court's ruling.
To establish a prima facie case of a violation of the
Nonintercourse Act, a plaintiff must show that “(1) it is an Indian
tribe, (2) the land is tribal land, (3) the United States has never
consented to or approved the alienation of this tribal land, and
(4) the trust relationship between the United States and the tribe
has not been terminated or abandoned.” Golden Hill Paugussett
Tribe of Indians v. Weicker, 39 F.3d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 1994).
To constitute an Indian tribe within the meaning of the
Nonintercourse Act, an Indian group must show that it was “a body
of Indians of the same or a similar race, united in a community
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under one leadership or government, and inhabiting a particular
though sometimes ill-defined territory.” United States v.
Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 442 (1926) (quoting Montoya v. United
States, 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901)) (emphasis added). In Golden
Hill, the court concluded that “[t]he Department of the Interior's
creation of a structured administrative process to acknowledge
‘nonrecognized’ Indian tribes using uniform criteria, and its
experience and expertise in applying these standards, had made
deference to the primary jurisdiction of the agency appropriate.”
Id. at 60.
Thus, while the “federal court, of course, retains final authority
to rule on a federal statute,” it should nonetheless “avail itself of
the agency's aid in gathering facts and marshaling them into a
meaningful pattern.” Id. That is precisely what occurred in the
case. The district court deferred to the factual findings of the DOI,
but “agree[d] that it must independently apply applicable law to the
factual findings.” United States v. 43.47 Acres of Land, 896 F.
Supp. 2d 151, 157 (D. Conn. 2012). And it did.
Ultimately, the district court concluded that the evidence
submitted by STN was insufficient to satisfy the Montoya standard
requiring that the group be “united in a community under one
leadership or government.” Montoya, 180 U.S. at 266. In so
deciding, it relied on DOI's conclusions that STN had presented
insufficient direct evidence of a distinct tribal community from
1920 to 1967 and after 1996, and of political authority over tribal
members from 1801 to 1875 and after 1996.
It was appropriate for the district court to rely on the DOI's
factual findings. To hold to the contrary would require the district
court to conduct the independent, complex evidentiary hearing that
this court sought to avoid in Golden Hill.
Finally, because the court found that the district court
appropriately deferred under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to
DOI's factual findings in concluding that STN did not satisfy the
Montoya criteria, the court did not address whether the doctrine of
collateral estoppel applies in this case.
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the district court
was affirmed.
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B. January–March Cases
1. Rusty Coal Blackwater v. Sec’y of Interior
No. 3:14–cv–00244, 2015 WL 506475 (D. Nev. Feb. 5, 2015).
Before the court was Defendants’, Secretary of the Interior and
Bureau of Indian Affairs’ (Defendants), Motion to Voluntarily
Remand Matter to Secretary of the Interior. Plaintiffs, Rusty Coal
Blackwater and Trent Lane Blackwater (Plaintiffs), filed an
Opposition.
In 2004, Congress passed the Western Shoshone Claims
Distribution Act (Act) to resolve the United States’ failure to pay
the Western Shoshone Nation amounts that the United States had
promised pursuant to a 1863 treaty between the United States and
Western Shoshone. The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
determined that people with twenty-five percent Western Shoshone
blood would be eligible for the distribution of funds.
Plaintiffs submitted documentation to prove that they are
twenty-five percent Western Shoshone, and received notification
from the BIA that they had met the qualifications and would
receive funds pursuant to the Act. In March of 2011, Plaintiffs
each received partial payment in the amount of $22,013.00. Other
individuals who were eligible under the Act received a second
payment of $13,124.93, for a total $35,137.93.
The BIA subsequently rejected Plaintiffs’ claims to the
payments, believing that their grandmother was a woman named
Betty Davis and that they were not twenty-five percent Western
Shoshone. Plaintiffs responded with additional documentation
showing that their grandmother was Betty Ann Thomas Williams,
along with her birth certificate confirming that Williams was the
daughter of a “Full Blood Shoshone.”
The BIA maintained that evidence indicated that Plaintiffs’
grandmother was Betty Davis, and that they were not eligible for
the payments. In response, Plaintiffs filed additional documents
describing their heritage and bloodline.
The Assistant Secretary for the Department of the Interior
affirmed that Plaintiffs were not eligible for payments under the
Act. Plaintiffs filed an appeal to the Interior Board of Indian
Appeals, and the appeal was effectively denied. Plaintiffs filed a
Complaint, requesting that the Court declare that the BIA and
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Secretary of the Interior deprived Plaintiffs of due process by
rejecting their claim for benefits under the Act, and that the
decision was arbitrary and capricious.
The court granted Defendants’ Motion for Voluntary Remand.
2. Liberty v. Jewell
No. CV 14–77, 2015 WL 1467107 (D. Mont. Mar. 30, 2015)
(mem.). The court granted the motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction and denied as moot Defendants’ motions in the
alternative.
Plaintiff Ramona Liberty (Plaintiff), an enrolled member of the
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes (Tribe), owned a
fractional interest in allotment land situated on the Flathead Indian
Reservation in Montana. The allotment was originally held in trust
for Plaintiff’s mother Julia Matt Hawkins, an enrolled member of
the Tribe, pursuant to the Allotment Act.
Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant Sally Jewel, in her
official capacity as the Secretary of the United States Department
of the Interior, and Defendant Kevin Washburn, in his official
capacity as the Assistant Secretary of the Interior–Indian Affairs,
(Defendants) for Defendants’ alleged actions with respect to her
allotment interest.
Count One of the Amended Complaint alleged various
generalized breaches of trust obligations by Defendants with
respect to Plaintiff’s interest in the allotment land. Count Two
alleges violations of the Indian Land Consolidation Act, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 2201-2221 (ILCA) and the Indian Self–Determination and
Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450–458hh, (ISDEAA),
based on Defendants’ actions with respect to Plaintiff’s interest in
the allotment land.
Defendants contended that the court lacks jurisdiction because
Plaintiff failed to demonstrate a waiver of the United States’
sovereign immunity with respect to her claims.
This suit was properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
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C. April–June Cases
1. Quechan Tribe of Ft. Yuma Indian Reservation v. United States
599 F. App’x 698 (9th Cir. 2015) (mem.). Plaintiff Quechan
Tribe alleged that the United States violated statutory, common
law, and constitutional duties that it owed the Tribe when it
provided inadequate medical care at the Fort Yuma Service Unit of
the Indian Health Service (IHS).
According to the complaint, the Unit’s facilities were the oldest
in the IHS system, were in a condition of disrepair, and created
unsafe conditions for tribal members seeking care. The district
court granted the government’s motion to dismiss.
Plaintiff alleged that the United States had a duty to meet a
specific standard of adequate medical care based on: (1) the
federal-tribal trust relationship; and (2) two federal statutes, the
Snyder Act and the Indian Health Care Improvement Act.
However, the federal-tribal trust relationship did not, in itself,
create a judicially enforceable duty. Rather, “trust obligations of
the United States to the Indian tribes are established and governed
by statute rather than the common law, and in fulfilling its
statutory duties, the Government acted not as a private trustee but
pursuant to its sovereign interest in the execution of federal law.”
United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2318
(2011).
Neither the Snyder Act nor the Indian Health Care
Improvement Act contained sufficient trust-creating language on
which to base a judicially enforceable duty. Both statutes “speak
about Indian health only in general terms,” Lincoln v. Vigil, 508
U.S. 182, 194 (1993), and neither required the United States to
provide a specific standard of medical care. See 25 U.S.C. § 13; 25
U.S.C. § 1601.
This court also could not compel IHS to allocate greater
funding to the Unit, because IHS’s allocation of the lump-sum
appropriation for Indian health care was committed to its
discretion. Lincoln, 508 U.S. at 190–92.
Finally, Plaintiff had no judicially cognizable due process or
equal protection claims. State actors were not liable for failures to
protect individuals’ due process rights to safe conditions in the
absence of a special, custodial relationship. Campbell v. Wash.
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Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 671 F.3d 837, 842–43 (9th Cir.
2011). The solution lied in Congress and the executive branch, not
the courts.
Affirmed.
2. Shinnecock Indian Nation v. United States
782 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Indian tribe brought action
against federal government, alleging that government, acting
through federal court system, denied any and all judicial means of
effective redress for unlawful taking of lands currently comprising
New York town from tribe and its members. Government moved
to dismiss tribe’s claims as unripe and outside court’s jurisdiction.
The Court of Federal Claims, 112 Fed. Cl. 369, granted motion.
Tribe appealed.
The appellate court held that: (1) tribe’s breach of trust claims
against United States were not ripe for adjudication; and (2) Court
of Federal Claims lacked jurisdiction over tribe’s judicial takings
claim.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
3. Wolfchild v. Redwood Cnty.
112 F. Supp. 3d 866 (D. Minn. 2015). In this case, Plaintiffs
sought possessory rights and damages concerning a twelve square
mile area of land in southwestern Minnesota. In order to obtain
such relief, Plaintiffs sought to eject an Indian Tribe from
reservation lands and seventy-five private landowners who,
together with their ancestors, had possessed the land at issue for
over one hundred and fifty years.
Prior to bringing this action, Plaintiffs litigated related claims
against the United States before the Court of Federal Claims for
over eleven years, which resulted in nine published opinions.
A review of those nine opinions demonstrated the breadth and
depth of the issues that were actually litigated. Those nine opinions
also assisted in demonstrating that the claims asserted in this case
were so completely frivolous and without a factual or legal basis
that they had to have been brought in bad faith.
The court found that such conduct warranted severe sanctions
against both Plaintiffs and their counsel and granted Defendants’
motions for sanctions and ordered Plaintiffs and their counsel to
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pay Defendants their reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, in
addition, Plaintiffs were required to post an appeal bond in the
amount of $200,000.
4. Shields v. Wilkinson
790 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2015). Appellants, Shields and Wilson,
were Indians with interests on the Bakken Oil Shale Formation in
the Fort Berthold Reservation in North Dakota, allotted to them
under the Dawes Act of 1887. Such land was held in trust by the
government, but could have been leased by allottees. Shields and
Wilson leased oil and gas mining rights on their allotments to
companies and affiliated individuals who won a sealed bid auction
conducted by the Board of Indian Affairs in 2007. After the
auction, the women agreed to terms with the winning bidders, the
BIA approved the leases, and the winning bidders sold them for a
large profit. Shields and Wilson filed a putative class action,
claiming that the government had breached its fiduciary duty by
approving the leases for the oil and gas mining rights, and that the
bidders aided, abetted, and induced the government to breach that
duty.
The district court concluded that the United States was a
required party which could not be joined, but without which the
action could not proceed in equity and good conscience, and
dismissed.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The United States enjoyed
sovereign immunity for the claims and could decide itself when
and where it wanted to intervene.
5. Robinson v. Jewell
790 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2015). Non-federally recognized Native
American tribe and its elected chairperson sued Secretary of
Department of Interior (DOI), county, and ranch owners asserting
title to ranch. The district court, 885 F. Supp. 2d 1002, dismissed
complaint, and plaintiffs appealed.
The appellate court held that: (1) tribe’s failure to present claim
pursuant to California Land Claims Act of 1851 extinguished its
title to property; (2) Congress’ ratification of 1849 Treaty with
Utah did not give tribe any enforceable rights to property;
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(3) treaty that was never ratified by Senate carried no legal effect;
(4) reservation for tribe was not created pursuant to Act of
Congress of 1853; and (5) any rights to property that tribe
possessed as result of Acts of 1853 and 1855 were extinguished by
Act of 1864.
6. Pueblo of Jemez v. United States
790 F.3d 1143 (10th Cir. 2015). Indian tribe brought action
against the United States seeking to quiet its allegedly
unextinguished and continuing aboriginal title to lands under the
federal common law and the Quiet Title Act. The district court
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Tribe appealed.
The appellate court held that: (1) United States’ grant of land to
private landowners did not extinguish a tribe’s aboriginal right of
occupancy; (2) there was no evidence that private landowners’ use
of the land was inconsistent with tribe’s occupancy of the land;
(3) tribe sufficiently put the United States on notice of its claim to
aboriginal title; and (4) the Preservation Act did not extinguish the
tribe’s aboriginal title.
D. July–August Cases
1. Bruette v. Jewell
No. 14-CV-876, 2015 WL 111624 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 24, 2015).
Plaintiff Felix J. Bruette, Jr., brought this pro se civil action against
Sally Jewell, the Secretary of the United States Department of
Interior (DOI). Bruette stated that he was “the great great
Grandson and direct lineal descendant of Stephen Gardner,” who
was “a signatory under Article V of the Treaty of February 5th,
1856 and declared to be an ‘actual’ member of the Stockbridge and
Munsee Tribe by the United States Congress on March 3rd, 1893.”
As a linear descendent of Stephen Gardner, Bruette claimed he was
entitled to certain rights and privileges, including a pro rata share
of tribal funds and the right to occupy tribal lands. Bruette brought
this action in an attempt to vindicate those rights.
The court concluded that the court lacked jurisdiction over his
claims and that his action be dismissed.
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